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ABSTRACT
THE MARKET POWER. - EFFICIENCY TRADEOFF,
RESIDUAL DEMAND ELASTICITY ANALYSIS,
AND THE USAIR - PIEDMONT MERGER
John Stephen Stockum
Supervisor: Dr. Almarin Phillips
Topics in antitrust theory, empirical analysis, and policy are
examined, with an application to the USAir-Piedmont merger. The first
chapter presents Cournot models to assess the welfare tradeoff between
increases in market power and increases in efficiency that may result from
a merger. The magnitudes of efficiency gain sufficient to satisfy two
alternative welfare standards are derived. To satisfy the first standard,
the efficiency gain must be sufficient to offset the deadweight loss
created by increased market power. To satisfy the second standard, the
efficiency gain must be sufficient to offset the incentive to increase
prices resulting from increased market power. In both cases, the critical
efficiency gains derived offset the effects of the mergers that are
determined endogenously within the model, rather than effects that are
predetermined. Results are presented for a range of assumptions about
the number of firms, the pre-merger markup·of price over marginal cost,
and fixed costs.
The second chapter evaluates the method of residual demand
elasticity analysis. The relationship between residual demand
elasticities and market power is examined. Alternative methods for making
inferences of post-merger market power using estimates of pre-merger
residual demand elasticities also are examined.
The third chapter estimates and analyzes residual demand
elasticities for the USAir-Piedmont merger. Five routes on which the two
firms competed prior to the merger are examined. Pre-merger time-series
data is used to estimate pre-merger, posc-mexger, and market residual
demand elasticities for each route. The results suggest that a
significant degree of market power existed on some routes prior to the
merger and that increased market power appears likely to result from the
merger on some routes. Other routes exhibit highly elastic residual
demand in spite of high levels of market concentration.
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CHAPTER 1
THE MARKET POWER - EFFICIENCY TRADEOFF IN A COURNOT MODEL
Once economies are admitted as a defense, the
tools for assessing these effects can be expected
progressively to be refined solemn
references to early oratory might finally be
displaced in favor of analysis in the continuing
dialogue in antitrust enforcement. (Williamson,
1968, p. 34)
I. Introduction
Some mergers may result in increases in both market power and
efficiency. Williamson (1968) shows that the deadweight loss due to a
given price increase can be offset by a gain of producer surplus due to
a relatively small efficiency gain. This paper presents Cournot models
to illustrate the tradeoff. Rather than deriving the cost reductions that
offset given price increases, as Williamson does, I derive the cost
reductions that offset endogenously determined price increases due to a
given change in market concentration.
In addition, I distinguish between two alternative standards for the
degree of cost reduction that offsets market power increases. A cost
reduction meets the "Williamson standard" if it is sufficient to offset
the deadweight loss and thus prevent total surplus from falling. However,
if this standard is met, a redistribution from consumers to producers
still may result. The alternative and more stringent "consumer surplus
standard" is based on the fact that prices are a direct function of
marginal costs, and thus an efficiency gain in the form of a reduction in
marginal costs results in a price reduction. The consumer surplus
standard is met if the marginal cost reduction is sufficient to offset the
1
incentive to increase prices due to increased market power, and thus
prevent consumer surplus from falling. Williamson does not address the
important effect of efficiency gains on prices.
The Cournot model, in which price is an inverse function of the
number of firms, is used in this paper to provide several illustrations
of the welfare tradeoff. The results indicate the direction and magnitude
of effect of market concentration, cost structure, and markup of price
over marginal cost on the determination of the critical values of
efficiency gains. The results can be adjusted to reflect conjectural
variations other than Cournot conjectures, and such adjustments
significantly affect the derived critical values of cost reductions.
However, such generalizations of the model appear to remove much of its
ability to explain the impact of industry variables on the market power-
efficiency tradeoff. Indeed, it is interesting, but not particularly
useful, to illustrate that a wide range of effiCiency gain may be required
by a given welfare criterion depending on the value of the pre-merger and
post-merger conjectural variation.
Cournot models, though they do not contain the full range of
industry possibilities, provide an interesting simplified illustration of
many important aspects of the welfare tradeoff issue. There is no
intention to suggest that the Cournot model's assumptions are realistic
or that its results are typical. However, it should be noted that the
Cournot assumption is not the only determinant of the relationship between
price and number of firms; thus the model permits a significant degree of
generality.
2
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While chapter 1 uses a Cournot model, the empirical model introduced
in chapter 2 and estimated in chapter 3 does not rely on behavioral
assumptions such as Cournot. Restrictive assumptions about competitive
behavior, while they often are necessary in order to structure theoretical
analysis such as that in this chapter, should not be included in empirical
models that attempt to measure market performance.
The results in this chapter illustrate the significant difference
between the magnitudes of efficiency gains that are required to satisfy
the two welfare standards. For example, a particular merger in a five-
firm industry requires a 1.5% marginal cost reduction to satisfy the
Williamson standard and a 10% marginal cost reduction to satisfy the
consumer surplus standard.
The significant difference between the two standards implies that
the choice of a standard is an important prerequisite for policymakers'
consideration of efficiencies as a mitigating factor. The courts
historically have not considered efficiency gains to be a mitigating
factor in merger cases and have even considered them to be an aggravating
factor because cost advantages may serve to increase the ability to
monopolize. Although the 1984 Justice Department Merger Guidelines place
increased emphasis on efficiency gains (compare 1982 Guidelines, section
4 and 1984 Guidelines, section 3.5), the Guidelines are ambiguous about
what degree of efficiency gains is required. The 1984 Guidelines
specifically mention the price-reducing effect of efficiency gains and do
not mention the deadweight-loss-offsetting effect. Thus it might appear
that the DOJ favors the more stringent consumer surplus standard. Yet
3
this standard has received little attention in the literature. (A notable
exception is Fi~her, Johnson, and Lande, 1989.)
In part II, I present a simple Cournot model and derive the marginal
cost reductions that meet the Williamson standard. In part III, I derive
the cost reductions that meet the Williamson standard for the case where
the efficiency gain occurs in the form of a reduction in fixed cost. In
part IV, I derive the cost reductions that meet the consumer surplus
standard. In part V, I derive the cost reductions for both standards in
a model in which firms are not assumed to be of equal size, in order to
represent more realistically the asymmetric nature of the pre-merger and
post-merger market share distribution.
II. The Model and the Williamson Standard
Consider an industry with n firms producing a homogeneous commodity
with no fixed costs and constant marginal cost, denoted cn• The inverse
market demand function is characterized by the linear expression Pn-a-bQn,
a>O, b>O, where Qn is the total industry output. Total (consumer plus
producer) surplus in the industry is
Cournot-Nash equilibrium values are
(1. 2) Pn a+ncn
n+1
(1. 3) Qn nqn
(1.4) qn a-c__ n
b(n+1)
Substituting (1.3) and (1.4) into (1.1),
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(1.5) w -n n(n+2)(n+l)2
~Z
2b
Now consider a change in the number of firms from n+l to n. Rather
than imposing a certain degree of cost reduction and analyzing the welfare
effects. the proportional difference between cn and cn+l that satisfies
alternative welfare standards will be derived. The difference in total
surplus between the industry with n firms and with n+l firms is
(1. 6) n(n+2) (a-cnlz
2b(n+l)2
(n+l)(n+3)(a-cn+1122b(n+2)2
To determine the magnitude of cost reduction that satisfies the
Williamson welfare standard. 1.e. that is sufficient to offset the
deadweight loss due to the price increase endogenously determined in the
Cournot model. set (1.6) equal to zero and solve for cn:
(1. 7) (a-cn12
(a-cn+l)2
(n+3)(n+l)3 - N
n(n+2)z
N is defined for notational simplicity. Normalizing so that a-l.
Equation (1.8) is the derived critical relationship between cn and
cn+l that satisfies the Williamson welfare standard. The proportional
difference between cn and cn+l implicit in (1. 8) is dependent on the
initial value of Cn+l assumed. By assuming an initial value for Cn+l' we
implicitly impose a pre-merger markup. Define the (n+1)-firm markup as
(1.9) L - In+l.:.£n+l
cn+l
Then substitute Pn+1 from (1.2) into (1.9) and solve for
(1.10) cn+l. 1/(Ln+2L+2) •
Substituting (1.10) into (1.8) yields
(1.11) cn - 1 - L(n+2)JN
1+L(n+2) .
5
We are primarily interested in the critical value of the percentage
change in costs, 1.e. in
(1.12) c*
Substituting (1.10) and (1.11) into (1.12) yields
(1.13) *c L(n+2) (jN-1)
So c* in (1.13) is the percentage cost reduction that is sufficient
to offset the deadweight loss due to a reduction in the number of firms
from n+1 to n. Note that c* is a function only of the markup and the
number of firms. Note also that because markup appears multiplicatively
in (1.13), a percentage markup twice as great necessitates a percentage
cost reduction twice as great.
Table 1.1 was compiled from equation (1.13) for various combinations
of markups and numbers of firms. (The market demand elasticities implicit
in these calculations are given in parentheses under each figure; they are
arc elasticities calculated between the n-firm price and the (n+1)-firm
price.) So, for example, if a four firm (n+1-4) industry has a markup of
20%, the loss of one firm (n-3) will not result in a welfare loss if
average cost is reduced by at least 1.2%.
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TABLE 1.1
c·-Percentage Reduction in Marginal C~st that Satisfies
the Williamson Standard for a Reduction in the Number
of Firms from n+l to n
n 3
L
.05 .10 .20 .30 .50
1 .013 .027 .053 .079 .133
(11) (6.1) (3.4) (2.5) (1.8)
.005 .011 .022 .032 .054
(7.7) (3.9) (2.1) (1.6) (1.1)
.003 .006 .012 .018 .030
(5.4) (2.8) (1.6) (1.1) (0.8)
.002 .004 .008 .011 .019
(4.4) (2.3) (1.2) (0.9) (0.6)
.001 .003 .005 .008 .013
(2.6) (1.9) (1. 0) (0.8) (0.5)
2
4
5
In this model, the price increase due to a merger is inversely
related to the number of firms in the industry. Thus the deadweight loss
and the cost reduction called for by the welfare standard also are
inversely related to the number of firms.
The inverse relationship between markup and market demand elasticity
can be seen in table 1.1: the endogenously determined price increase due
to a merger also is inversely related to the market demand elasticity.
Thus the deadweight loss and the cost reduction called for by the welfare
standard are direct functions of the number of firms.
The small degree of efficiency gain that is sufficient to offset the
anticompetitive welfare loss caused by mergers in highly concentrated
markets in this model may appear anomalous. This result is not an
artifact of the linearity assumptions or the assumption of Cournot
7
behavior. Rather, this result is largely due to the fact that the
efficiency gain modelled accrues to the entire range of output while the
deadweight loss accrues only in the range of the output restriction caused
by the increase in market power. Thus a very small percentage cost
reduction multiplied by a large level of output easily exceeds the
deadweight loss triangle within the much smaller range of the output
reduction.
It also is apparent, both in table 1.1 and in the following tables,
that reductions in the number of competitors do not appear to have a very
significant affect on pricing when there are more than about three firms
in the industry. If these theoretical results were consistent with
marketplace reality, it would appear that antitrust policy should focus
on mergers only in industries that are much more highly concentrated than
the markets that are referred to as "highly concentrated" in the Justice
Department's Merger Guidelines (1984, section 3.11). However, such
inferences may not be appropriate. It may be more appropriate to make
judgements about the threshold values of the Merger Guidelines from
empirical evidence, rather than from numbers that are derived from purely
theoretical models. Indeed, certain theoretical models may yield highly
monopolistic results at low levels of market concentration that contrast
sharply with the Cournot model, and it may not be concluded easily that
the assumptions of one model are more realistic than those of the other.
Alternatively, it may be the case that two or three competitors are enough
to prevent prices from greatly exceeding marginal cost in many industries.
But examination of theoretical models is unlikely to strongly support
either hypothesis.
8
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III. Fixed Costs
Efficiency gains may arise in the form of fixed cost savings, rather
than marginal cost reductions. For example, merging firms may close down
a plant and thus save the fixed costs of operating that plant, while
marginal production costs remain unchanged. Let cn-c for all n. Given
fixed costs, the loss of a firm due to a merger results in each remaining
firm expanding its output and thus reducing its average cost. The
reduction in average cost will be greater the larger are fixed costs. If
fixed costs are large enough, the deadweight loss will be offset by the
fixed cost savings. To determine what level of fixed costs is
sufficiently large for this to be the case, define f as a firm's fixed
costs so that (1.6) becomes
n(n+2) (a-c)2
2b(n+l)2
fn - (n+l)(n+3)(a-c)2 + f(n+l) .
2b(n+2)2
Setting (1.14) - zero, defining N', and solving for f,
(1.15) f ~2 (n+l)3(n+3)-n(n+2)2
2b (n+1)2(n+2)2
N' (a-c)2
2b
so that f in (1.15) is the critical value of fixed cost. In order to
derive the percentage change in average cost that is implied by the
critical value of fixed cost in (1.15), define c·· as the percentage
change in average cost:
(1.16) .*c c+f tOn+1 - (c+ftoni
c + f/qn+l
Substituting q's from_(1.4) and f from (1.15) into (1.16),
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(1.17) **c N' (l-c)
N' (l-c) (n+2)+2c
Then substituting c from (l.lq) (i.e. marginal cost as a function of
markup and the number of firms; note that markup in this case refers to
markup of price over marginal cost, not average cost.) into (1.17),
(1.18) **c N' (Ln+2L+1)
N'(Ln+2L+1)(n+2)+2
Table 1.2 was compiled from equation (1.18). So, for example, if
a five firm (n+1-5) industry has a markup of 20%, the loss of a firm (n-4)
will not result in a welfare loss if average cost is reduced by at least
1.2%. Note that the economy is due only to the saving of one firm's fixed
cost; marginal costs are held constant in this example.
TABLE 1.2
c**-Percentage Reduction in Average Cost that Satisfies the
Williamson Standard for a Reduction in the Number of Firms
from n+l to n: Fixed Cost Case
L
.05 .10 .20 .30 .50
1 .064 .071 .083 .095 .114
2 .026 .030 .037 .044 .056
n 3 .013 .016 .020 .025 .033
4 .008 .009 .012 .016 .021
5 .005 .006 .008 .011 .015
The marginal cost reductions in Part II reduced the price increase
endogenously determined by the reduction in the number of firms. In the
fixed cost case, cost savings do not affect pricing. Thus, the deadweight
losses are larger in the fixed cost case, and thus the values in table 1.2
are significantly higher than those in table 1.1.
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IV. The Consumer Surplus Standard
Marginal cost reductions reduce firms' profit-maximizing prices, as
is seen in equation (1.2). In Part II the cost reduction reduces the
price increase due to increased market power, thus also reducing the
deadweight loss relative to a merger in which there is no change in
marginal cost. The price-reducing effect of an efficiency gain may be
sufficiently large to offset the price-increasing effect of the increased
market power. Then because price does not fall, consumer surplus does not
fall, and there is a gain in producer surplus. For both the fixed cost
case and the zero fixed cost case, to determine what cost reduction is
sufficient to keep the price from rising due to the loss of one firm,
simply set Pn+1-Pnfrom (1.2) and solve for cn. The critical value is
(1.19) cn (n+1)2cn+1.:...S!
n(n+2)
Substituting (1.10) and (1.19) into (1.12) yields the simple expression
(1.20) •• *c Lin
1.e. the percentage reduction in marginal cost sufficient to offset the
price-increasing effect of increased market power from n+l to n firms Is
simply the markup divided by the number of firms. Table 1.3 was compiled
from equation (1.20). So, for example, if a five firm industry (n+1-5) has
a markup of 20%, the loss of a firm (n-4) will not result in a price
increase if marginal costs are reduced by 5%. The critical values in
table 1.3 are much greater than those in table 1.1. This difference
illustrates the importance of the choice of a welfare standard to the
magnitude of efficiency required.
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TABLE 1.3
c***-Percentage Reduction in Marginal Cost
that Satisfies the Consumer Surplus Standard
for a Reduction in the Number of Firms from n+1 to n
L
.05 .10 .20 .30 .50
1 .05 .10 .20 .30 .50
2 .025 .05 .10 .15 .25
n 3 .017 .033 .067 .10 .167
4 .013 .025 .05 .075 .125
5 .01 .02 .04 .06 .10
V. Firm Asymmetry
The combination of two firms should be expected to result in a firm
"larger" than the individual pre-merger firms. Symmetric firm models,
such as those used in earlier sections, do not capture the inherently
asymmetric characteristics of mergers. In this section, I generalize the
model to allow firms to differ from each other. In a symmetric (n+1)-firm
homogeneous good model, two pre-merger firms together have 2/(n+l) of the
market, while post-merger they have lIn of the market, the same share as
the non-merging firms. A "merger" in a symmetric firm model is not really
a merger, but rather is the exit of a firm, resulting in each remaining
firm increasing its market share proportionately. In addition to being
an unrealistic characterization of the post-merger distribution of market
share, symmetric firm models do not result in the firms having incentive
to merge in the first place, as Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) show.
DeGraba (1988) resolves the problem by simply having the post-merger firm
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maintain both cost functions of the pre-merger firms (this
characterization is equivalent to perfect collusion between two firms).
Thus the post-merger firm's cost function is the horizontal sum of the two
firms' pre-merger cost functions. This method is useful to illustrate the
behavioral asymmetry between the pre-merger and post-merger state, but
does not permit us to characterize efficiency gains because the industry
cost structure does not change due to the merger.
Like DeGraba, Perry and Porter (1985) assume that the post-merger
firm maintains the assets (or capital stock) of the two pre-merger firms.
However, Perry and Porter assume a cost function in which the increased
capital stock results in a cost reduction. A third manner of firm
asymmetry exists if the industry has differentiated products and the new
firm maintains both "brands" from the merger partners (see Deneckere and
Davidson, 1983).
Another possibility is that firm asymmetry arises due to asymmetric
strategic behavior such as Stacke1berg competition. Daughety (1986) shows
that social welfare maximization in a Stacke1berg model implies that there
exists a significant amount of behavioral asymmetry (l.e. several leaders
as well as several followers). Thus even without efficiency gains a
merger between two followers that results in their becoming a Stacke1berg
leader often will increase competition and thus also welfare. In reality
a merger may involve cost, demand, and behavioral asymmetries. In this
section the previous model will be adapted to account for cost asymmetry.
The assumptions of the previous model are maintained in this example
with the exception of the cost function. Cost asymmetry can .be
characterized in many. different functional forms; the cost function used
13
was chosen for computational simplicity. I assume that there is a factor
whose total supply to the industry is fixed; this factor will be referred
to as capital. The capital may be distributed among the firms in any way,
thus any combination of firm sizes can be modelled. For example in an
n-firm industry in which firms have equal shares of capital, each firm has
a capital share of ki-l/n. If two of these firms merge, their combined
capital share is kij-2/n. This asset is assumed to enter the firms' cost
functions in the following way: firm i's total costs are
(1.21) Ci(qi,ki) (c+d/ki)qi
The extent to which a larger stock of the asset results in lower
unit costs is dependent on the relationship between c and d. If c is
large (small) relative to d, a merger results in a small (large)
efficiency gain. Rather than exogenously setting the relation between
these variables and thus also setting the degree of efficiency gain, the
critical relation that prevents a welfare loss will be derived. The
formulation implies that the efficiency gain is specific to the firms
being merged, not industry-wide as in the earlier examples. Thus the
model in this section provides a reasonable interpretation of
firm-specific efficiency gains as well as more adequately representing the
asymmetric nature of mergers and acquisitions. We look first at a merger
in which two firms. of a symmetric (n+1)-firm industry combine their
assets. This model proceeds similarly to the earlier model. The algebra
becomes rather copious, however, and thus only the results are presented
here. Given the pre-merger markup the critical relationship between c and
d that results in a cost reduction sufficient to offset the deadweight
14
so that it can be compared to the earlier cases. Thus c**** is the
loss is derived. This result is then converted into a percentage
reduction in unit costs:
(1.22) ****c c+d/k - (c+d/2k)
c+d/k
percentage by which the merger partners' unit costs exceed their
pre-merger costs (and by which they exceed the other firms' costs which
remain unchanged after the merger). The results are in table 1.4 and can
be interpreted similarly to the results in table 1.1. For example. if two
firms from a symmetric three-firm industry with a pre-merger markup of 10%
merged, and thus controlled two-thirds of the industry's capital stock.
a 2% reduction in the merger partners' unit costs is sufficient to offset
the deadweight loss due to the price increase resulting from the merger.
TABLE 1.4
c****-Percentage Reduction in Average Cost that Satisfies
the Williamson Standard for a Merger Which Reduces the Number
of Firms from n+l to n: Asymmetric Firms Case
L
.05 .10 .20 .30 .50
1 .014 .034 .056 .085 .141
2 .011 .021 .043 .064 .113
n 3 .009 .020 .039 .049 .100
4 .007 .015 .028 .044 .073
5 .006 .013 .025 .037 .053
Next, as in Part IV, the cost reduction sufficient to prevent the
post-merger price from exceeding the pre-merger price is derived for the
asymmetric-firm model. Surprisingly. the number of firms drops out of the
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derivation of the critical value in this case. Not only is the percentage
cost reduction sufficient to result in the post-merger price equaling the
pre-merger price a function only of the pre-merger markup. but it equals
the pre-merger markup. regardless of the number of firms in the industry!
The results are presented in table 1.5. For example. if two firms from
a symmetric n-firm industry with a pre-merger markup of 10% merged. and
thus controlled 2/n of the industry's capital stock, the merger will not
result in a price increase if a 10% cost reduction is realized by the
merger partners.
Because in the Cournot model the price increase due to a merger is
an inverse function of the number of firms in the industry. we should
expect that a smaller cost reduction should be necessary to meet the
welfare standard the more firms there are in the industry. In fact this
is what we observed in the earlier examples. But because in this case the
efficiency gain occurs for the merging firms only. the smaller is the
combined market share of the merger partners. the larger is the cost
reduction that is necessary to offset a given price increase. These two
effects offset each other exactly given the assumptions of this example.
The effect of having the efficiency gain accrue only to the merger
partners also can be seen in table 1.4. Although c····is still an inverse
function of the number of firms in the industry, its rate of decrease is
much slower than in the previous examples. Again this is because the
efficiency gain occurs only for the merger partners. thus the smaller is
their market share. the greater is the cost reduction that is necessary
to offset a given deadweight loss. Also. comparing tables 1.4 and 1.5.
we can see that the consumer surplus standard requires a much greater
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efficiency gain than the Williamson standard, as we saw in comparing
tables 1.1 and 1.2.
TABLE 1.5
c*****-Percentage Reduction in Average Cost that Satisfies the
Consumer Surplus Standard for a Merger Which Reduces the
Number of Firms from n+l to n: Asymmetric Firm Case
L
.05 .10 .20 .30 .50
1 .05 .10 .20 .30 .50
2 .05 .10 .20 .30 .50
n 3 .05 .10 .20 .30 .50
4 .05 .10 .20 .30 .50
5 .05 .10 .20 .30 .50
The Merger Guidelines (1984, section 3.11) state that if a proposed
merger results in an increase of the industry's Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) of more than 100 and the post-merger HHI substantially exceeds 1800,
"only in extraordinary cases" will mitigating factors prevent the Justice
Department from challenging it. Recall that the HHI is simply the sum of
the squares of the individual firms' market shares. A merger in a
symmetric five-firm industry that results in the merger partners
controlling 40% of the industry's assets and the three other firms each
controlling 20% (although the HHI is calculated in terms of market share,
industry assets will be used here as a proxy) results in the HHI rising
from 2000 to 2800. However, as we see in table 1.4, a net welfare loss
will not result from this merger if there is a 1.5% cost reduction,
assuming that the pre-merger markup is 10%. And as we can see in table
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1.5, this same merger will not result in a price increase if there is a
10% cost reduction. Whether or not thes~ circumstances constitute an
"extraordinary case" is an empirical question.
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CHAPTER 2
RESIDUAL DEMAND ELASTICITY THEORY
AND ANTITRUST POLICY
"It is only because we lack confidence in our
ability to measure elasticities, or perhaps
because we do not think of adopting so explicitly
economic an approach, that we have to define
markets instead." (Posner, 1976, p. 125)
I. Introduction
Economic theory suggests that a number of factors affect an
industry's competitive performance. According to the Justice Department's
Merger Guidelines (1984, sections 3.1-3.4), these factors include market
concentration, ease of entry, product homogeneity, information about
specific transactions and buyer characteristics, the degree of difference
between the products and locations in the market and the next-best
substitutes, similarities and differences in the products and locations
of merging firms, ability of small or fringe sellers to increase sales,
and conduct of firms in the market. With the exception of market
concentration measures, antitrust analysts generally offer primarily
qualitative descriptions of these.variables and their potential effect on
competitive performance. No systematic means of measuring these variables
or combining them into a quantitative measure of an industry's
performance, or estimate of prospective change in performance due to a
merger, is generally practiced.
Data and time constraints, due in large part to the structure of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino antitrust review process, are the popular
rationalizations for the current methodology. Such arguments seem to
imply that there is an alternative methodology that could be used if the
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constraints were not present; however, no such methodology is generally
recognized.
The focus of much of the empirical industrial organization
literature is the attempt to explain the relationship between pricing (or
profits) and variables accounting for market concentration, entry
barriers, and demand. These studies have had limited success at
specifying the relationship between structure and performance, in part due
to the difficulty of accounting for many of the relevant variables, and
in part due to the inherent endogeneity of many of the relevant
variables .1 Further, the specifications of these empirical models
generally are not derived form models of industry behavior. Few
economists would argue that the coefficients on the· market structure
variables estimated in these studies should be used to draw inferences
about the potential effects of specific mergers.
Baker and Bresnahan (1984, 1985, 1988) have introduced a method for
estimating a firm's residual demand elasticity, which is inversely related
to market power. Residual demand elasticity estimation attempts to
determine the extent to which market power is being exercised by a firm,
and the extent to which market power can increase because of a merger
between two firms, without completely specifying the relationship between
profitability and all of its numerous interrelated determinants. Other
studies (e.g., Iwata, 1974. and Lliang. 1987) estimate firms' conjectural
variations. Conjectural variations, which can be thought of as an
implicit component of residual demand elasticities. exclude the important
1For discussions of some of the problems of these empirical studies,
see Waterson (1984, ch , 10), Clarke and Davies (1982), and Phillips
(1976).
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effect of demand elasticity on competitive performance, and the estimation
procedure requires assumptions more restrictive than those required by
residual demand elasticity estimation.
Since Baker and Bresnahan's papers, no further empirical
applications or discussions of the theory of residual demand elasticity
have appeared in the literature (with the exception of Scheffman and
Spiller's application (1987) that is restricted to the subject of market
definition). This paper addresses the theory underlying the analytical
method in greater detail than in Baker and Bresnahan's papers, focusing
on the generality of the assumptions required by the method.
Section II presents the. model. Section III.A discusses the
relationship between demand elasticity and the Lerner index, and derives
a generalized version of the relationship. Section III.B discusses the
relationship between the Lerner index and market power, and evaluates
several apparent discrepancies in the relationship. Section IV.A
describes Baker and Bresnahan's approach to estimating post-merger
residual demand elasticities using pre-merger residual demand
elasticities, and generalizes the assumptions necessary for using their
method. Section IV.B offers an alternative methodology for making
inferences about post-merger market power. Section IV.C discusses the
endogeneity of firms' choices of product characteristics and the
implications of this endogeneity for interpretation of the results.
Section V describes how residual demand elasticities can be used to derive
the magnitude of efficiency gain that is sufficient to offset the welfare
effects of an estimated increase in market power.
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In a generalized. model, the issue of whether to specify price as a
II. The Hodel
function of quantity, or quantity as a function of price, should be a
matter of notation rather than a matter of behavioral assumptions. In
this paper, price is stated as a function of quantity, and it should
become clear that the formulation does not necessarily imply specific
competitive behavior, such as Cournot. Firm j's inverse demand function
may be written as
(2.1)'
where Qo is a vector of the outputs of the other firms in the industry and
Y is a vector of exogenous demand variables. The first-order condition
for firm j's profit maximization is
(2.2)
where dCj(Qj,W,Wj)/dQj is marginal cost, W is a vector of exogenous
industry-wide factor prices, and Wj is the vector of firm j's firm-
specific factor prices. Qo is defined implicitly in the system of (n-l)
first-order conditions for firms j-2, ••.n as
(2.3)
Equation (2.3) is the vector of reaction functions of firms 2 through n
to firm l's output. Substituting (2.3) into (2.1) for firm 1 yields
(2.4)
Equation (2.4) is firm l's residual demand function, implicit in
which is the behavior of firms 2,•..n. The endogene ity of Ql in this
specification necessitates a simultaneous-equations estimation technique.
Ordinary least squares estimators are not consistent estimators of the
structural coefficients, because the residual demand equation is a single
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unidentified equation from a simultaneous system. Rather than fully
specifying the simultaneous system of supply and demand functions, a
limited-information approach such as two-stage least squares can be used.
To identify the parameters of the firm-specific residual demand function
with two-stage least squares, data is required on variables that enter
firm l's supply function but are not correlated with the error term in its
demand equation. These instruments are regressed on Ql in the first-stage
regression, and the second-stage estimates the residual demand function
where the fitted values of Ql from the first-stage regression are
substituted for Ql'
Factor prices that appear in firm l's supply function appear to be
an obvious choice for instruments in this specification. However, because
many of firm l's factor prices also may be factor prices for its
function. Firm-specific cost variables W1 that are not included in
competitors, such industry-wide factor prices (W) appear in firm l's
residual demand function (see equation 2.4) as well as in its supply
equation (2.4) are needed for use as instruments. In order for the
instruments to identify the residual demand equation, significant
variability of W1 that is independent of the variability of Wand Wo is
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required. This requirement is an obstacle preventing the applicability
of this method in many markets, because in many markets either costs are
highly correlated across firms, or data are not available on the cost
components which might not be highly correlated across firms.2
2For example, as Froeb and Werden (1990, p. 14) note, Scheffman and
Spiller (1987) used regional fuel prices as cost shifters, but these
variables likely would be highly correlated across their sample.
Note that dPl/dQl from firm l's first-order condition can be
expressed as
(2.5) 4fl - ill + ill MJo •
dQl SQl SQo SQl
converting (2.5) to an elasticity measure,
(2.6)
which will be denoted
(2.7)
n
el - ell + ~ eljrjl
j-2
where e1 is firm l's inverse residual demand elasticity, ell is firm l's
inverse own-demand elasticity, elj is the inverse cross-demand elasticity
between firm l's price and firm j's output, and rjlis the elasticity of
firm j's reaction function with respect to firm l's output. (Reaction
function elasticities are sometimes referred to as conjectural variation
elasticities.) Conjectural variations, not recoverable from the
estimation process described, are discussed here only to clarify their
role as an implicit characterization of competitive interaction which can
be thought of as a component of residual demand elasticity.
Some game theorists contend that the dynamic process of
oligopolistic interaction cannot be represented adequately in a static
framework (for example, see Friedman, 1983, pp. 106-7). Reaction
functions appear to be ambiguous in a single-period model, such as the one
above. However, a single-period observation of the prices and quantities
determined by a dynamic process must include an implicit characterization
of the reaction functions in the dynamic game being played. The
conjectural variations implicit in the reaction functions can be
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considered to be endogenously determined by the information structure of
the industry, the ease of entry, and other factors.
Note that different oligopoly theories can be described in terms of
different values of rJ!. Cournot competition exists between firms i and
j if rji-O, because Cournot competitors assume that their competitors will
not respond to their changes in their output. Perfect collusion exists
if rji-1, because responding to competitors' output changes proportionally
effectively internalizes monopoly behavior. Bertrand competition exists
if rJi--1, because attempted output restrictions are met by equal and
opposite output expansions. Intermediate degrees of competition exist for
values of rJi between -1 and l.
The residual demand function can be estimated in 10g1inear form, so
that the coefficients on quantities will be elasticities. Denoting
xJ-1nXJ,
(2.4')
where Ul estimates el'
"Residual demand," as referred to herein. should be distinguished
from a functional form in which q2'" .qn are explicitly specified. If
qZ•.•.qn were explicitly specified in the demand equation, the coefficient
on ql would be an own-demand elasticity, ell' rather than residual demand
elasticity, el' The residual demand elasticity is a total derivative.
while the own elasticity is a partial derivative. While we find in the
next section that the residual demand elasticity is the relevant variable
for our analysis of competition. much of economic analysis focuses on the
own elasticity. For example, Chamberlin (1962, p . 75) refers to the
demand curve as "rigidly defined by the fixity of all products and of all
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other prices." Expected consumer responses, but not competitor responses,
are implicit in this specification of the demand function. However, the
actual demand function facing a firm, and thus the marginal revenue that
a firm considers in determining its profit-maximizing price and output,
must incorporate expectations of both competitor and consumer responses.
III. Demand Elasticity, Lerner Indices, and Market Power
A. The Relationship Between Demand Elasticities and the Lerner Index
It is well known that the Lerner index, (p-mc)/p, is an inverse
function of demand elasticity. The applicability of the relationship has
been perceived to be limited because it usually is derived in the context
of models with restrictive assumptions. The assumptions underlying the
relationship often are not explicitly acknowledged or adequately
explained. In addition, the relationship is derived for various forms of
demand elasticities: market elasticity, firm elasticity, residual
elasticity, own elasticity, etc. In this section, the relationship will
be .derived in a generalized form. Restrictive assumptions such as
homogeneous products and Cournot behavior are not required. The
derivation and discussion will clarify the necessary underlying
assumptions, which will be shown to be less restrictive than recognized
in many articles, including those of Baker and Bresnahan.
From firm l's first-order condition, equation (2.2), we can derive
(2.8) - ~l Q1 - ~l.:.£l
dQl P1 P1
equation (2.8) can be expressed as
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(2.9)
n
-e1 - - (e11 + l: eljrj1) - .f1.:.£1
j-2 Pi
i.e. the negative inverse residual demand elasticity of a firm is equal
to its Lerner index. The relationship is general in that it does not rely
on any assumptions about competitive behavior,3 functional form of demand
or costs, effects of potential entry, number of firms, the degree of
product heterogeneity, or market definition. Although the notation
specifies n firms, it will not be necessary to solve l:e1jrj1 for each
individual competitor; i.e. it is only their aggregate implicit effect on
e1 that is of interest. Thus the n firms should be thought of as all
competitors producing any good which consumers consider to be substitutes
for firm l's good and any firms perceived by firm 1 as being potential
competitors. As will be discussed below, firm 1 is assumed to be
optimizing subject to its expectations of other players' (consumers,
competitors, and potential entrants) behavior, but that behavior is not
specified, and thus other players' optimizing behavior and industry
equilibrium are not necessary for the relationship to hold.
This relationship is derived in many different contexts in many
papers. Because the relationship is usually derived in the context of a
3Note that the. above derivation does not assume Cournot behavior,
because dP1/dQi is a total derivative, not a partial derivative. Defining
quantity as a function of price and differentiating with respect to price
yields the identical result:
(2.1')
(2.2') Qj + PjgQj - dCj gQj
dPj dQj dPj
If the residual demand function is monotonic in (Pj,Qj)-space, then
dPj(.)/dQj-l/dQj(.)/dPj. Dividing (2.2') by dQj/dPj yields equation (2.2),
and thus also equation (2.8).
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model with restrictive assumptions, the general applicability of the
relationship usually is overlooked. Examples of the restrictive (though
sometimes unstated) assumptions underlying various versions of the
relationship include dominant firm (Landes and Posner, 1981, pp. 944-5;
Ordover, Sykes, and Willig, 1982, p. 1861), monopoly (Tirole, 1988, p. 66,
70, 137; Clarke and Davies, 1982, p. 279, and Posner, 1976, p. 246),
homogeneous goods (Appelbaum, 1982, p. 290; Iwata, 1974, p. 947), and
Cournot (Landes and Posner, 1981, p. 984).
Baker and Bresnahan (1984, pp. 12-14; 1988, pp. 289-90) list several
sets of assumptions that are sufficient for the relationship to hold.
These assumptions are dominant firm behavior, Stackelberg behavior,
perfect competition, the "limit case of product differentiation" (1.e.
monopoly), and consistent conjectures equilibrium. The most general of
these assumptions is that of consistent conjectures equilibrium; however,
even this assumption is unnecessarily restrictive. Neither equilibrium
nor consistent conjectures are necessary for the relationship to hold.
Note that the relationship is derived, not from industry equilibrium
conditions, but from firm l's profit-maximizing first-order condition.
The relationship thus requires only that firm 1 is maximizing its profits
given its expectation about competitor and consumer responses, but does
not place any constraints on competitor and consUmer behavior, not even
profit-maximizing by firm l's competitors or industry equilibrium.
A type of "rational expectations" assumption about competitor and
consumer responses does underlie the relationship, but the necessary
assumption is less restrictive than Bresnahan's consistent conjectures
assumption. Because firm 1 maximizes profits with respect to its
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expectation of consumer and competitor behavior, the demand elasticity in
its first-order condition is an expected value, and thus equation (2.9)
could be written as
(2.9') n-E1(e1) - -E1(ell + l:e1jrj1) - .f1.:£.1,
j-2 P
1
i.e. firm l's Lerner index equals firm l's expectation of its residual
demand elasticity, where El is firm l's expectation operator. Baker and
Bresnahan (1988), consistent with Bresnahan's (1981) model, assume that
firms know the parameter values elj. j-l •..•n. and express equation (2.9)
(see their equation 11) as
each of its competitors' conjectural variations (.1.e. E1(rjl) - rjl.
j-2 •...n). l:rj1 does not satisfy Baker and
Bresnahan's consistent conjecture assumption. Knowledge of each
individual firm's rjl is needed. because each rjl interacts with each elj
separately.
Thus. in addition to the unnecessary assumption that the industry
be in equilibrium. Baker and Bresnahan's consistent conjectures assumption
requires that firm 1 knows the n parameters elj' j-l, •••n , and has
rational expectations about each of the (n-1) parameters rj1' j-2 •...n.
However. it probably is very difficult for firms to make informed
inferences about partial derivatives based on the data that is observable
to the firm. Firm 1 changes .its price. and observes a change in its
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output. Firm 1 likely has very limited information about the extent to
which its· output change is influenced by eech of the (Zn-L) partial
derivatives. Rather, market behavior enables firm 1 to observe its
residual demand elasticity, el. If firm 1 has no information about any of
the (2n-1) partial derivatives, but has rational expectations about el'
i.e. E1(el)-el' then the residual demand elasticity predicts the Lerner
index without b Las ." Thus E1(e1)-e1, and profit-maximizing behavior on the
part of firm I, are sufficient to support the inverse relationship between
firm l's residual demand elasticity and its Lerner index.
Rational expectations about demand elasticity do not necessitate
rational expectations about competitor behavior, either as an aggregate
or for individual competitors. One might argue that rational expectations
about competitor behavior may lead to perfect collusion, because price-
cutting could be easily detected and punished. But firms' observations
of their residual demand elasticities contain a noisy signal of their
competitors' behavior, confounded by the effects of own-elasticities,
cross-elasticities, and exogenous parameters. The degree to which a
firm's behavior is hidden in the noisy signal received by its competitors
may significantly affect firms' conjectural variations and thus the degree
to which supracompetitive pricing can be maintained.
Next, an apparent indeterminacy in the demand elasticity-Lerner
index relationship will be refuted. The inverse relationship between
market power and a firm's demand elasticity may appear to conflict with
4Past observations of e1 may provide imperfect information about its
current value. Firm I, of course, can incorporate information in addition
to observations of past values of e1' in estimating the current el. No
source of bias in firm l's estimation of e1 is apparent.
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the fact that on certain demand functions (such as linear), there is a
direct relationship between price and demand elasticity. Thus it may
appear to be ambiguous whether a firm facing elastic demand is in a
competitive industry or has significant market power and has raised its
price into the elastic range of its demand curve. The apparent ambiguity
is due to a confusion between the relationship between price and demand
elasticity, and the relationship between profit-maximizin& price and
demand elasticity.
Although a price increase in some cases may leave a firm at a more
elastic point on its demand curve, a price increase that results in a move
to a more elastic point on a given residual demand function will reduce
a firm's profits. A firm will choose the price that maximizes its profits
on a given residual demand function, and (assuming no change in marginal
cost), will raise that price only if its residual demand becomes more
(from equation 2.9), regardless of the functional form of demand,
(2.10) del
dPl
This relationship may appear ambiguous in part because of a
confusion between market and firm-specific demand elasticity. Consider
a merger that increases firms' market power, 1.. e. reduces the firms'
demand elasticities and thus enables them to raise price. The market
demand curve (1..e. the demand curve facing a hypothetical monopolist) does
not shift due to a change in competition among the firms in that market.
The post-merger price is higher than the pre-merger price on the same
market demand function, and thus the market demand elasticity may be
higher post-merger. Accordingly, the merger results in firm demand
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elasticity falling and market demand elasticity rising. This somewhat
counterintuitive result has resulted in some confusion about the
relationship between demand elasticity and market power. But the inverse
relationship between the Lerner index and a firm's demand elasticity is
not made indeterminate by the fact that demand curves may have a direct
relationship between price and demand elasticity.
Of course. estimations of demand elasticities appear throughout the
literature. However. the specifications of the models generally are not
residual demand functions, and thus yield demand elasticities from which
market power inferences should not be made. If. for example. rather than
specifying a residual demand function. Pl-Pl(Ql'Y.W). we more fully specify
the demand function as P1-P1(Ql.QZ•...Qn.Y.W). the coefficient on Ql will
have an ambiguous relationship with firm l's Lerner index. In addition.
the inclusion of structural variables such as entry barriers and market
concentration implies that the coefficient on Ql will have an ambiguous
relationship with firm l's Lerner index.
B. The Relationship Between the Lerner Index and Market Power
The previous subsection establishes that under very general
conditions. a firm's Lerner index is equal to its negative inverse
residual demand elasticity. In order to make market power inferences from
observations of residual demand elasticities. it also is important to
understand the relationship between the Lerner index and market power.
The Lerner index. (p-mc)/p. is an index of market power because it
directly reflects the allocative inefficiency due to the divergence of
price from marginal cost that results from the exercise of market power.
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Because market power often is defined as the ability to charge a price
greater than marginal cost, in this respect the Lerner index appears to
be an accurate index of the degree of market power. However, the Lerner
index has been criticized by some authors (e.g., Clarkson and Miller,
1982, p. 60, Landes and Posner, 1981, p. 941). Several actual and
perceived problems with Lerner indices, and the implications for
applications of residual demand elasticity analysis, are discussed below.
While the Lerner index reflects the "degree" of market power being
exercised, this degree is only one dimension of the welfare loss due to
the exercise of market power. Two industries with the same Lerner index
may have very different degrees of welfare loss due in part to a
difference in output levels.5 The Lerner index is a component of the
calculation of welfare loss, but additional information is required.
However, for many policy purposes, an estimate of the total welfare loss
is not necessary. An estimate of a Lerner index or a change in a Lerner
index is sufficient information to make many antitrust enforcement
decisions. One application that might appear to require more information
about welfare losses than a Lerner index, but does not, is determining
the degree of efficiency required to negate an estimated increase in a
Lerner index (see section V below).
Second, if marginal costs are an increasing function of output, the
current marginal cost is less than the marginal cost that would exist if
there were a procompetitive output expansion. In this case, the Lerner
SThe relevant output dimension of deadweight welfare loss actually is
not the output produced, but rather the difference between the output
.produced and the output that would be produced if price equalled marginal
cost.
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index overstates the degree to which prices exceed the level of marginal
cost that would exist in the hypothetical perfectly competitive state.!
Third, comparing "markups" based on accounting data across
industries may show large variations that appear to be attributable to
factors other than differences in competitive performance. This may imply
that the markups are not appropriately estimated Lerner indices, rather
than that there is an inherent problem with Lerner indices as an index of
market power. Comparisons of accounting-data-based markups may overlook
important industry cost differences in areas such as marketing and
research and development, as well as differences in the opportunity costs
of some resources (see Clarkson, 1977). This issue is illustrated by
apparently high markups in breakfast cereals and pharmaceuticals,
industries in which marketing and R&D are relatively high. As discussed
in Klein and Lefler (1981) and Shapiro (1983), firms' earnings on
A fourth problem arises due to the fact that Lerner indices are
investments in such intangible assets is not inconsistent with competitive
performance.
inversely related to marginal costs, as well as directly related to
anticompetitive behavior. The inverse relationship between Land c can
be seen by
c~ - p
5ll. - _.:::,dc:...,__
dc p2 ~ 0, since c ~ P and Qf ~ 1dc
(Of course dL/dc-O in perfect competition, where c-p and dP/dc-l). In
other words, efficiency, rather than market power, may be responsible for
a high Lerner index (e.g., see Demsetz 1973). Alternative cost structures
6This argument is discussed in Landes and Posner (1981), p. 941.
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for an industry could result in the alternative with the higher price
being the alternative with the lower Lerner index. However, the argument
that a firm's relatively high Lerner index is due to its relative
efficiency implies that the efficiency this firm has achieved is not
available to other firms, because otherwise competition would dissipate
the profits from the efficiency. In effect, the firm's exclusive access
to the efficiency is a source of market power; however, it is socially
beneficial market power relative to the alternative absence of this unique
efficiency. To the extent that an individual firm's efficiency advantage
relative to competitors can persist in the long run, this criticism of
Lerner indices is valid. Indeed, we should be especially careful not to
mislabel firms with differential efficiencies as anticompetitive.
Fifth, the Lerner index reflects the divergence of· price from
marginal cost, not just due to anticompetitive behavior, but also due to
product differentiation. If products are imperfect substitutes, firms'
prices can exceed their marginal costs even if their conjectural
variations are perfectly competitive (see equation 2.7). It might be
argued that antitrust policy should focus on anticompetitive conduct,
rather than on the divergence of price from marginal cost due to other
factors such as product differentiation.
However, as can be seen in equation (2.7), the degree of product
differentiation, as measured by cross-elasticities of demand, interacts
with firms' conjectural variations to determine competitive performance.
If two merging firms have very low cross-elasticities, a change in their
conjectural variations from competitive to collusive will have relatively
little effect on their Lerner indices. Because antitrust policy
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presumably is intended to influence competitive performance, both the
degree of substitution and the degree of competitive conj ecture are
important to the analysis.7
In addition, product differentiation in some instances may not be
exogenous, but rather determined as part of the competitive process. 8 For
example, the most profitable point in product characteristic space
generally is one that limits the substitutability between a firm's product
and its competitors' products (e.g., see Prescott and Visscher, 1977).
Firms presumably consider this important factor in their choices of
product characteristics. Thus, "competitiveness" cannot be completely
separated from substitution among firms' products, even in theory. Of
course, industries with structural barriers insulating firms from
competition may not be easily distinguished from industries with
beneficial product innovations. In the latter case, similar to the
differential efficiency case discussed above, we must be careful to avoid
punishing innovative leaders by labeling them as anticompetitive. Thus,
greater skepticism should be placed on Lerner indices as measures of
market power in industries undergoing rapid innovation.
Thus, the interpretation of Lerner indices is subject to ambiguity
from a number of sources. For some types of interpretation, some of the
sources of ambiguity are relatively inconsequential. For example, in
7The importance of the degree of consumer substitution is recognized
in the Merger Guidelines in sections 3.412, "The Degree of Difference
Between the Products and Locations in the Market and the Next-Best
Substitutes," and 3.413, "Similarities and Differences in the Products and
Locations of the Merging Firms." Noquantitative method of evaluating the
competitive significance of these variables is suggested.
SA further discussion of the implications of the endogene1ty of firms'
choices of product attributes is in section IV.C below.
36
comparing Lerner indices across equal-sized geographic markets in the same
industry, it often may be safe to assume that certain cost characteristics
are the same across markets.
A Lerner index change brought about by a merger, as opposed to the
level of the Lerner index, is not subject to most of the sources of
ambiguity discussed. Assuming no efficiency gains due to the merger
(efficiency gains will be considered in section V), and assuming no shift
in exogenous factors, such as market demand, an increase in the Lerner
index must result from an increase in market power. For the purpose of
antitrust analysis of a merger, it 1s the change, not the level, of market
power that is relevant. Section IV describes how post-merger changes in
Lerner indices can be predicted using residual demand elasticities.
IV. Post-Merger Residual Demand Elasticity Inferences
A. The Baker and Bresnahan Method
While inferring the current degree of market power from estimated
residual demand elasticities is a useful exercise, it is the change in
market power resulting from a merger that is important for the antitrust
analysis of mergers. Baker and Bresnahan suggest a method of making such
inferences, however their method raises some difficult issues which they
do not discuss. This section analyzes their method and finds theoretical
support for their assumptions under certain industry conditions. Section
B suggests an alternative method for making post-merger inferences.
Section C discusses the possible implications of endogenous choice of
product characteristics on our ability to make post-merger inferences.
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Yhile the ordinary demand curve of a group of consumers is the
simple horizontal summation of the consumers' individual demand curves,
the residual demand curve that would face a group of firms if they were
to merge is not the simple horizontal summation of their residual demand
curves. For example, consider a market with impenetrable entry barriers
and two competitors. Competitive interaction between the two firms may
result in highly elastic residual demand for both firms, and the
horizontal sum of their demand curves also may be highly elastic, although
they would face relatively inelastic demand if they merged. The
difficulty in making inferences about post-merger demand elasticities from
pre-merger data is in determining the independent effect on residual
demand elasticities due to competitive interaction between the two merging
firms, as opposed to the effects of competition from other sources and the
effect of consumer demand elasticity.
Suppose that firms 1 and 2 propose to merge. Firm l's pre-merger
inverse demand function may be written as
(2.11)
where Q_ is the output of non-merging firms. Firm l's first-order
condition for profit maximization is
(2.12) Pl(Ql.Qz,Q_.Y) + QldPl - Q.Ql!.Ql'Y'Y1)
dQl dQl
Q_ is defined implicitly in the system of first-order conditions for firms
j-3 •... n as
(2.13)
Substituting (2.13) into (2.11) yields
(2.14)
38
Equation (2.14) is firm l's "partial" residual demand function.
Estimation of partial residual demand functions yields partial residual
demand elasticities, which will be denoted with a p in their subscripts,
as
(2.15) ellp £211
dq1 dqZ-O
n
- ell + ~ e1jrj1j-3
Note that the difference between (2.7) and (2.15) is that in (2.15)
the summation begins at j-3. Similarly, e1Zp can be expressed as
(2.16) elZp- £211
dqz dql-O
n
- £121 + ~ £121 19.jc5qz j-3 s qj sqz
n
- e12 + ~ eljrjZj-3
The partial residual demand function can be estimated in loglinear
form, so that the coefficients on quantities will be elasticities.
(2.17)
where O'ijestimates eijp.
Baker and Bresnahan's method for making post-merger inferences 1s
based on an assumption that the two firms will adjust their output
proportionally post-merger, i.e. that c5qd6qz-1. If the proportional
post-merger output adjustment assumption is met, a one percent decrease
Thus firm l's estimated
post-merger residual demand elasticity is ellP+elZp.
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The Lerner index-residual demand elasticity relationship derived in
section III.A implies that a given increase in an inverse residual demand
elasticity will result in that same magnitude of increase in the Lerner
index. Firm l's post-merger Lerner index should be -(ellp+e12p)and the
estimated increase in the Lerner index for firm 1 is el-ellp-e12p' The
implied percentage price increase is (el-ellP-e12p)/(1+eup+e12p)' The
proportional output adjustment assumption is a convenient mathematical
device that enables us to make post-merger market power inferences. The
assumption may be reasonable under certain circumstances but does not
appear to apply generally. Baker and Bresnahan do not examine the
assumption.
The proportional output adjustment assumption, 6Qd6q2-1, can be
interpreted as a unitary conjectural variation between the two firms. A
unitary conjectural variation is the equilibrium result of collusion or
merger in simple oligopoly models (e.g., Cubbin, 1983, Waterson, 1984),
and thus may be a reasonable assumption. Indeed, it makes intuitive sense
that colluding firms will change their outputs proportionally, because
proportional responses imply coordinated behavior. However, as noted by
Forbes (1988), collusion implies 6qd6q2-l only if there is "symmetry"
between the two firms, which is characterized by 6~1/SP2-S~2/SP1' where ~i
denotes firm i's profits. However, Forbes does not address the market
characteristics that will yield this symmetry.
At the extreme, if the merging firms' products are perfect
substitutes, and if the two firms face the same constant marginal cost,
it is economically irrelevant how they distribute their output between
them. If, alternatively, the firms' products are perfect substitutes and
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the firms face the same increasing cost function, the firms will produce
the same outputs pre-merger, and will adjust their output proportionally
post-merger in order to minimize the cost of producing any given output.
Thus in either case, the proportional output adjustment assumption holds.
Product differentiation complicates the issue, however the
proportional output adjustment assumption is reasonable in markets with
certain forms of product differentiation. Consider a model of one-
dimensional product differentiation. If demand is uniformly distributed,
and if firms have the same cost functions and are located at uniform
intervals, the products of any two'firms (not just adjacent firms) will
be symmetrically differentiated, in the sense of the Forbes definition
above. Symmetric distribution of competitors, though it may seem to be
a stringent assumption, is an equilibrium outcome in models of product
differentiation when firms choose their product characteristics (e.g.•
Prescott and Visscher, 1977). Of course. we should expect that, given
uniform demand, firms will choose locations that limit the
substitutability between their product and their competitors' products.
Though this simple one-dimensional product differentiation model is
intuitive, its assumptions, such as uniform demand', are not necessarily
required for symmetric product differentiation to exist.
Assume that two firms face the same constant marginal cost and the
following symmetric linear demand functions:
(2.18) PI a + bQI + CQ2
(2.19) P2 a + bQ2 + cQI .
Solving the model for the pre-merger and post-merger equilibrium outputs
of the two firms. we find that the two firms' outputs change
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proportionally. Thus equivalent demand elasticities and cross-
elasticities yield proportional output adjustments. Proportional output
adjustments may occur more generally. However, in more complex models,
if we set the proportional output changes of the two firms equal, and
solve for the conditions necessary to support the relationship, the
conditions do not have intuitive interpretations.9
B. An Alternative Method
An alternative method for making inferences of post-merger demand
elasticities from pre-merger data is based on a simple approach that is
sometimes used in calculating "market" demand elasticities. The market
demand elasticity is the demand elasticity that would face a hypothetical
monopolist in a particular product and geographic market. An approach
that has been used to calculate market demand elasticities is to simply
sum the sales of the firms in the market and calculate the demand
elasticity of this quantity with respect to the average market price.
Note that this simple method differs from a horizontal summation of the
firms' demand curves in that consumer switching among firms within the
market definition due to changes in relative prices is internalized, i.e.
such switching does not affect the calculated demand elasticity.
Internalizing inter-firm switching is the fundamental difference between
market demand elasticities and firm-level demand elasticities.
9For example, if we generalize the above model to
(2.18') P1 - a + bQl + cQ2
(2.19') P2 - e + fQ2 + gQland allow the two firms to face different marginal costs, d and h.
respectively, set (Ql'-Ql)/Ql-(Q2'-Q2)/Q2'and solve, we get
(g2+2fcr21)(hd-ha-ed+ea) + cr21(2ehg-e2g-h2g+2ceh-ce2-ch2) -
(c2+2bgr12)(hd-ha-ed+ea) + gr12(2adc-a2c-d2c+2gad-ga2-gd2).
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This same method could be used to calculate the "market" demand
described in the Merger Guidelines. This method internalizes consumers'
firms. as opposed to the market defined by other means such as that
elasticity based on a market definition that includes only th~ two merging
switching between the two firms' goods, and thus yields an estimate of the
post-merger demand elasticity that the merged firm would face.10
of the sales of the firms in the market. They refer to their estimates
estimate "market" demand elasticities based on quantities that are the sum
Scheffman and Spiller (1987) use residual demand analysis to
firms in the market.
of demand elasticities as the "potential market power" of the group of
industry, and the method appears reasonable in this context. The demand
They apply the method to a homogeneous good
curve that would face a hypothetical combination of producers of a'
in two dimensions.
differentiation implies that market demand curves may not be well defined
homogeneous product can be represented in two-space, while product
differentiated product contexts. Symmetry between firms, discussed above
However, we should not necessarily dismiss the method in all
with respect to Baker and Bresnahan's method for making post-merger
inferences, also should satisfy this approach.
If the average of two
firms' prices yields the same total sales regardless of the distribution
of prices across firms, 1.e. if there is a unique mapping from average
lOA simple two-period example with two firms illustrates this point.
In the first period, Pl-lO, Ql-8, P2-8, Q2-10. In the second period, firm
1 increases its price, and firm l's sales fall, in part because some
consumers switch to firm 2: Pl-ll, Ql-6, P2-8, Q2-11. Firm l's demandelasticity is four, and the demand elasticity of the combined firm,
calculated using the two firms' average price and total quantity. is one.
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price to total quantity, then the market demand elasticity is well
defined. This unique mapping need not exist for all possible
distributions of prices that constitute a given average price, but only
for those combinations of prices that are observed in the sample. Indeed,
it may be true that under fairly general conditions the average of two
competitors' prices that we observe in equilibrium will yield the same
total output sold by the two firms.
Given a homogeneous good or a unique mapping from average price to
total quantity, this method will yield a demand elasticity that is on the
market demand curve, because the sum of the outputs of a group of
producers sold at a given price must be the output that they could sell
at the same price if they acted in concert; however, the elasticity may
be on a different point on the demand curve than the monopolist's profit-
maximizing price. Thus the estimated market demand elasticity may not be
the equilibrium demand elasticity for the hypothetical monopolist.
This alternative method of inferring post-merger market power has
not been rigorously demonstrated to be superior to Baker and Bresnahan's
method, but it has intuitive support and can be estimated with very little
marginal effort. Thus the method, at the very least, provides a promising
intuitive alternative. In chapter 3, post-merger residual demand
elasticities will be estimated using Baker and Bresnahan's method and the
alternative method just proposed. In addition, market demand elasticities
will be estimated using average price and total market quantity. Because
the market demand elasticity is the demand elasticity that would face the
hypothetical monopolist, it provides a reference point to determine the
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Competing retail chains may merge and close or relocate some of their
stores. Similarly, two airlines may merge and redistribute the times at
which they schedule flights, and perhaps also reduce the number of
flights, on routes on which they previously competed.
As many models of product differentiation illustrate, the further
is a customer's optimal product choice from the closest available choice
(in product-characteristic space, geographic space, or time space), the
greater is the "travel" cost that must be incurred. However,
redistributing and reducing product characteristics may not have an
unambiguous effect on welfare. Both demand and costs may be affected by
changes in the products offered by producers. Though additional
differentiated products add to consumer welfare, fixed cost per product
implies that total surplus does not rise unambiguously as the number of
differentiated products increases. As Spence (1976) shows, the
equilibrium level of product diversity provided by multiproduct firms may
be either greater or less than the social optimum, depending on own- and
cross-elasticities of demand and the level of fixed costs. Competition
can generate too much product diversity because the fixed cost of an
additional product offering may more than offset the incremental consumer
benefits, although the firm's incentive to introduce the product may still
exist because some consumer surplus is transferred from one firm to
another. As Spence shows, the incentive to provide the optimal product
mix is dependent on the fraction of net surplus from an incremental
product introduction that a firm can capture (p. 410). Yhile Spence does
not address how the degree of competition affects this incentive (he uses
a monopolistic competition model), clearly the externality described is
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internalized as competition falls. Of course the net effect on consumer
welfare is unclear.
In addition, a reduction in product offerings may involve other
sources of efficiency gains important to a welfare analysis of a merger.
For example, an airline merger may result in fewer flights offered per day
on a given route, but; the airline may be able to use larger, more
efficient aircraft and/or fly at a higher rate of capacity than in the
pre-merger state (perhaps because competition resulted in both firms
offering flights during certain periods in which demand was not sufficient
to fill two larger aircraft). Thus, although the method of making post-
merger inferences discussed in sections A and B focuses on price effects
of horizontal mergers under conditions that are relatively general, other
sources of consumer welfare loss and efficiencies are possible; a full
welfare analysis of the effects of a merger should include consideration
of all such effects. Unfortunately, the magnitudes of many market power
and efficiency effects are difficult to estimate.11
V. Efficiency Gains
As discussed in chapter I, an efficiency gain may be sufficiently
large to negate the welfare loss caused by the increased market power
created by the merger. "Sufficiently large" might be defined as
sufficient to offset the deadweight loss due to the price increase (the
Williamson standard) or as sufficient to deter the merger partners from
raising price above the pre-merger level (the consumer surplus standard).
llSee discussion of Morrison and Winston (1987) in chapter 3, section
III, infra.
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Determining the magnitude of efficiency gain that would satisfy the
consumer welfare criterion might seem to be a formidable task; but given
estimates of residual demand elasticities, the critical level of reduction
in marginal cost can be easily derived. From equation (2.9), solve for
firm l's price,
(2.20)
Assuming proportional post-merger changes in Ql and Q2 as before, the
post-merger price of firm 1 is
(2.21)
where prime subscripts denote post-merger values. The merger will result
in no loss of consumer surplus if Pl'-Pl• Thus, setting (2.20) equal to
(2.21) and solving for cl' yields
(2.22)
Thus Cl'· is the post-merger marginal cost that is sufficiently low to
keep firm 1'5 price from rising due to the additional market power created
by the merger. The percentage reduction in marginal cost implied by
(2.22) is
(2.23) - ~1~l1p.:jh2p
l+el
Thus the percentage reduction in marginal cost that would fulfill
the consumer surplus standard (1.e. Pl'-Pl) can be calculated from the
residual demand elasticities without imposing any additional assumptions
or requiring any additional data. In chapter 3, section V.D, this method
is applied to the USAir-Piedmont merger.
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CHAPTER 3
THE USAIR-PIEDMONT MERGER:
AN ESTIMATION OF RESIDUAL DEMAND ELASTICITIES
"••. we might have challenged USAir-Piedmont."12
I. Introduction
While many consider the Department of Transportation's permissive
antitrust stance toward airline industry mergers in the 1980s to have
resulted in significant reductions in competition. the case against
airline mergers has not been strongly supported by empirical studies.
More generally. empirical methods have had very limited success at
answering many important questions about competition and antitrust policy.
The necessity for policymakers to predict changes in competition due to
a merger ex ante provides a particularly difficult empirical problem.
Residual demand elasticity analysis, discussed in detail in chapter 2, is
used in this chapter to address the competitive implications of the USAir-
Piedmont merger on five routes on which they competed before the merger.
Those routes are Baltimore-Tampa, Washington-Norfolk, Boston-Norfolk,
Memphis-Nashville. and Baltimore-Orlando. Pre-merger time-series data are
used to estimate the pre-merger and post-merger degrees of market power
for each of the routes.
Section II is a brief discussion of airline industry competition and
policy issues. Section III is a discussion of alternative empirical
techniques that can be used to address airline competition. Section IV
describes the data and discusses specification issues. Section V
12Char1es Rule. Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust. Department
of Justice, quoted in Air Transport World. February. 1989. p. 36.
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the five l:outes.
describes the USAir-Piedmont merger and presents the empirical results for
II. Airline Industry Competition and Mergers
Recent mergers and increases in fares have raised concern among many
about competition 1n the airline industry.13 Some economists (e.g.,
Levine [1987] and Borenstein [1989]) argue that structural characteristics
resulting in anticompetitive performance in the industry include a
scarcity of landing slots and gates, "fortress" hubs, frequent-flyer
programs, airline-owned computer reservation services, and travel agent
commission incentives. However, the airline industry sometimes is cited
as having structural characteristics conducive to contestabi11ty,
particularly capital that is highly mobile. Bailey and Panzar (1981, p.
125) argue that "this theory [contestabi1ity] is particularly relevant to
city-pair airline markets."
Antitrust policy in the industry in the 1980s appears to have
followed this latter view. Table 3.1 below lists chronologically the
twenty largest airline mergers approved by the Department of
Transportation (DOT) between May, 1985, and October, 1987.
13Competitive concerns have been expressed by the press, (e.g., ~
Street Journal, July 19, 1989), by airline industry publications (e.g.,
Air Transport World, December, 1988), and by some economists (e.g., Kahn,
1988).
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Table 3.1: Recent DOT-Approved Airline Mergers
lillUSAir - Pennsylvania Commuter Airlines
Midway - Air Florida
Southwest - Muse
People Express - Frontier
United - Pan Am's Pacific Division
.liM
Piedmont - Empire
Horizon - Cascade
People Express - Britt
Northwest - Republic
Presidential - Key
Texas Air - Eastern
Alaska Air - Jet America
NA - Ozark
Texas Air - People Express
Delta - Western
Alaska Air - Horizon
l2llUSAir - Pacific Southwest
American - Air California
USAir - Piedmont
Braniff - Florida Express
There has been significant disagreement between the two federal
agencies responsible for antitrust enforcement in the industry. The
Department of Justice (DOJ) played an antitrust advisory role to the DOT
until 1989, when antitrust jurisdiction was transferred from DOT to DOJ.
Before the transfer of jurisdiction, DOJ recommended opposing three
mergers that were ultimately approved by the DOT (Northwest-Republic, TWA-
Ozark, and United's purchase of Pan Am's Pacific Division).
In the USAir-Piedmont case, the DOJ filed comments suggesting
possible anticompetitive problems, but later withdrew from the case
without an official recommendation. An industry publication reported,
"when asked why Justice did not oppose the USAir-Piedmont merger . . .
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Charles Rule told ~, '[Our arguments on] the three others were
rejected. ,1114 An administrati·!e law judge recommended disapproval of the
USAir-Piedmont deal (US DOT, 1987), but the DOT ultimately approved it.
More recently, the Justice Department challenged Eastern's sale of
Philadelphia gate space to USAir and the merger of American and Delta's
computer reservation systems. Some interpret these actions as signals
that the tide has turned in airline industry antitrust enforcement, and
that future airline mergers are unlikely to meet with federal government
approval. It appears that in spite of the volume of industry research,
there is not strong empirical support either for the past relatively lax
antitrust enforcement or for the present apparently stricter enforcement.
Because airline data is relatively abundant, the lack of applicable
empirical results may be primarily due to limitations in empirical
techniques.
III. Empirical Approaches to Analysis of Airline Competition
The airline industry has been the subject of numerous recent
structure-performance studies.1S These cross-section studies regress
fares on measures of market concentration, measures of potential
competition, dummy variables for slot-constrained airports, dummy
variables for hubs, measures of leisure vs. business travel, mileage, load
factors, and numerous other variables. Some of these studies (e.g.,
14Air Transport World, February, 1989, p. 36.
lSRecent papers include Brown and Warren-Boulton (1988), Borenstein
(1988), Ayres (1988), Hurdle, et 81. (1988), Morrison and Winston (1987,
1988), Butler and Huston (1987), Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan (1985), and
Call and Keeler (1985).
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Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan, 1985) characterize their approaches as tests
of the contestabllity hypothesis. The hypothesis of perfect
contestabi1ity generally is rejected because the coefficients on
structural variables are significant and positive. These studies are
unanimous in their conclusion that "structure matters."
Morrison and Winston's results (1988) indicate that for routes with
three or more carriers, a loss of one competitor increases average fares
by about $6 (less than one cent per mile). A reduction from two
competitors to one increases fares by $89 (nine cents per mile),
indicating a much more pronounced effect on fares of a second competitor
than of a third, fourth, etc. (and also indicating potential problems with
linearity assumptions in the specification of structural variables in many
of these studies).
Some of these studies have introduced an interesting innovation to
structure-performance analysis by including measures of potential
competition. Measures of the degree of potential competition are
relatively straightforward in this industry because the presence of
airlines operating out of one or both of the endpoints of a route suggests
that they may be best able to respond quickly to attempted anticompetitive
behavior on that route. Evidence that the presence of potential
competitors affects pricing is suggestive of a degree of contestability,
but the contestability is imperfect if the current number of competitors
also affects pricing. Morrison and Winston found that each potential
entrant (defined as a carrier with operations at both endpoints) reduces
average fares by $2.56 (one-fourth of one cent per mile).
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Variations on this potential entry specification include the
treatment of Hurdle (1988), who considers the d!fferential effects of
potential entrants based on ease of entry into alternative types of
airports. Hurdle finds that the effect of potential entry on yields
differs according to whether or not an entrant can achieve scale economies
at a given airport (1. e. whether the airport is small enough to be a
natural monopoly) and whether or not incumbents have developed scope
economies via hub-and-spoke systems at that airport.
Dummy variables for hub airports generally have positive
coefficients. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that hubs
somehow enable firms to maintain anticompetitive prices. One theory of
how hubs may facilitate anticompetitive pricing is that a carrier with
numerous flights to and from a hub is in a relatively strong position to
use predatory actions toward firms attempting to undercut the hubbing
firm's prices on individual flights to and from the hub (Levine, 1987, p.
445). But a significant source of efficiency from hubbing is that it
permits frequent service to routes that are so thinly traveled that they
could not support such service otherwise (Levine, 1987, p. 441).
Increased load factors on these thin routes result in lower unit costs.
But the positive coefficients on hub dummies suggest that the former
effect may outweigh the latter.
Borenstein (1989) argues that hubs constitute entry barriers in that
they foreclose input markets (e.g., the market for gates at a given
airport). He estimates cross-section equations for individual firms
rather than aggregating across firms as most of the other studies do. He
includes an airline's share of total enplanements at the endpoints and
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finds that the coefficient is significant and positive. This estimated
effect of airport share is independent of the effect of route share.
The coefficients on dummies for slot-constrained airports in these
studies are significant and positive. Morrison and Winston (1988) use
four slot dummies. one for each of the four slot-constrained airports.18
and the fact that the coefficients differ from one other by as much as a
factor of eight suggests that this specification is a significant
improvement over other studies' use of only one slot dummy.
One of the numerous innovations of Morrison and Winston's study is
that it makes inferences about post-merger market performance for specific
mergers. including the USAir-Piedmont merger. The method by which they
make post-merger inferences is to apply the structure-performance
coefficient estimates to the changes in the explanatory variables that
resulted from the merger. Thus. for example. if the number of carriers
on a route fell from seven to six because of the merger. the coefficient
estimate on number of carriers (-.0062) multiplied by the number of
passenger miles flown on that route per year yields an estimate of
consumer loss. Using this coefficient. Morrison and Winston estimate that
the USAir-Piedmont merger should result in a consumer loss of $81 million
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per year (1983 dollars).
In addition to the effect of mergers on fares, Morrison and Winston
also estimate the effects of mergers on other dimensions of consumer
welfare. including transfer time. schedule delay. and frequent- flyer
programs. Schedule delay is increased to the extent that reduced
18Slot-constrained airports generally are defined as the four airports
at which the FAA has established slot allocation mechanisms. Washington-
National, New York-LaGuardia. New York-Kennedy, and Chicago-O'Hare.
competition results in fewer flights and thus in greater lengths of time
between passengers' desired flight time and the closest available flight
time. Morrison and Winston first estimate passengers' value of schedule
delay time using a multinomial logit model of air traveler choices. Then
they use the estimate of the output reduction due to reduced competition
to infer the reduction in number of flights. Applying the value of time
estimate to the estimated reduction in flights yields the value of
consumer loss due to increased schedule delay.
Transfer time can be affected if the merger results in the merged
firm's serving a greater range of routes. More routes served by a single
carrier implies that some previously interline transfers can now be
accomplished intraline, and this generally leads to shorter transfer times
because of intraline coordination. Passengers' value of transfer time is
estimated to be much higher than their value of schedule delay time,
probably because passengers can make more productive use of time spent
before the actual flight than time spent between connecting flights. The
estimated value of transfer time is applied to the estimated time savings
due to increased number of intraline transfers to yield consumer savings.
Frequent-flyer benefits may result from a merger because the
increased number of routes served increases the value of the program to
members. In their structure-performance model, Morrison and Winston
include a frequent-flyer variable, number of frequent-flyer miles awarded
on a route times the number of cities served by the airline, and obtain
a positive coefficient. They then multiply this coefficient by the
increase in the number of cities served that results from the merger to
yield the increased value created by the enhanced frequent-flyer program.
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In the USAir-Piedmont merger, they estimate a gain to customers of $68
million per year (1983 dollars).
Morrison and Winston estimate several possible effects of airline
mergers that other approaches do not address. The net effect of these
variables that they estimate for the USAir merger is an annual consumer
loss of $12.7 million per year. However, these effects are derived from
the coefficient estimates from a structure-performance model that appears
to have many of the problems inherent in the other airline studies and
more generally in the very nature of structure-performance studies.
Structure-performance studies have been criticized for numerous
problems of model specification as well as significant data 1imitations.17
The recent airline studies do not appear to be immune from such problems.
One potentially important problem with the airline studies is omitted
entry variables. Entry impediments (such as gate and slot constraints)
and their effect on competitive performance may vary substantially across
geographic markets, and the entry variable proxies employed in these
studies, such as dummy variables for the few slot-constrained airports,
may miss the effects of many conditions of entry. For example, in several
cities, airlines' contracts with local airport authorities contain
apparently restrictive majority-in-interest clauses preventing the
authorities from expanding airport capacity without the consent of
incumbents. 18 In addition, congestion at many airports, particularly
during the most desirable flight times, may result in scarcity rents that
17See Waterson (1984, ch. 10), Clarke and Davies (1982), and Phillips
(1976).
18See Air Transport World, December, 1988, p. 60.
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drive up fares.19 Such constraints and their effects on fares may vary
substantially across airports and, absent a thorough study of their
characteristics, are not likely to be reasonably proxied in cross-section
structure-performance studies.
If market concentration and entry barriers are positively correlated
across geographic markets in the industry, omission of relevant entry
variables will result in an upward bias on the concentration coefficients,
and thus in policy prescriptions biased toward antitrust intervention.
The degree of entry barriers and the degree of market concentration may
be positively correlated because the supracompetitive profits from
achieving a higher market share, and thus the incentive to achieve a
higher market share, should be positively related to the degree of entry
barriers.
Residual demand elasticity estimation does not necessitate
structural variables such as measures of market concentration and entry
conditions, and thus it is not subject to many of the sources of
specification error that pervade structure-performance studies. Residual
demand analysis approaches the (in some respects less ambitious) task of
estimating the competitive performance of firms rather than explaining the
underlying relationship between structure and performance. The effects
of structural variables will be implicit in the estimates, but the
estimates do not explain the extent to which individual structural
19A recent FAA report notes that 21 US airports currently are
"seriously congested," because aircraft delays exceed 20,000 hours per
year. By the turn of the century, 50 airports are expected to be in this
category, and these airports handle 80% of US air traffic. See "FAA
Predicts Big Jump in Air Traffic, Portending More Crowds, Few Bargains,"
Wall Street Journal, March 2, 1990, p. Bl.
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variables are responsible for the estimated performance. By estimating
performance on individual routes,residua1 demand analysis can identify
which routes appear to be relatively problematic and thus which routes may
deserve po1icymakers' attention. In addition, partial residual demand
cross-elasticities can be estimated to make inferences about increases in
market power due to specific mergers on specific routes ..
Although it does not raise the same specification problems as
structure-performance, residual demand elasticity estimation raises other
specification problems, most importantly identification of the firm-
specific demand equation. Shifts of firm-specific cost variables are
needed to identify firms' demand equations, and we will see that the data
set appears to be well suited to this task.
Residual demand elasticity analysis can be performed on both cross-
section and time-series data. However, the data limitations that affect
cross-section structure-performance analysis also would affect cross-
section residua1-demand-e1asticity analysis. An inability to control for
factors that may vary across geographic markets implies that cross-section
demand elasticity estimates may be less useful than intra-market
estimates. In addition, it is individual markets that must be the focus
of analysis for many antitrust applications, such as the review of airline
mergers and gate sales.
But one advantage of cross-section analysis is that pre-merger
demand elasticity estimates can be compared to post-merger estimates.
Such comparisons will be impractical with time-series data because of
limitations on the number of observations. In the airline industry,
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quarterly data implies that a merger could not be analyzed using time-
series data until several years after it was consummated.
However, before-after cross-section comparisons raise other
problems. Results may differ substantially depending on the quarters
chosen. For example, the quarter or two immediately following a merger
may not reflect the complete integration of the companies, and thus the
full realization of market power or efficiencies. The multi-year
transition toward full integration of USAir and Piedmont illustrates this
point. In addition, market power increases may appear large at first,
although entry may result and drive prices down. Thus cross-section
comparisons may reflect quasi-rents rather than sustainable market power.
This point may be illustrated by the number of entrants into Minneapolis-
based routes following the Northwest-Republic merger.
Another problem with comparing pre-merger and post-merger residual
demand elasticities may at first appear to be an advantage. Post-merger
residual demand estimates will incorporate the actual effect of changes
in both market power and efficiency, both of which are relevant to the
welfare effects of a merger. However, we will not be able to determine
the independent effect that the two factors had on the Lerner index.
Without holding either costs or market power constant, a change in a
Lerner index has ambiguous welfare consequences. Substantial efficiencies
may result in increases in the Lerner index when the post-merger price
actually falls. Methods for inferring market power changes from pre-
merger data such as the two approaches discussed in chapter 2, section IV,
while prospective, are able to hold costs constant and thus are not
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subject to this source of ambiguity. Efficiencies then can be
incorporated into the analysis (chapter 2, section V).
Last, the before-after cross-section approach can address the
effects of a merger only ex post, while antitrust agencies often must
estimate the effects of a merger ex ante. While it certainly is useful
to look back on the actual effects of a merger, antitrust enforcement
often requires a forward-looking approach. Thus, intra-market time-
series residual demand analysis appears to have substantial advantages
relative to both cross-section residual demand analysis and structure-
performance analysis.
\
IV. Description of Data and Discussion of Specification Issues
A. Introduction
Since Baker and Bresnahan's application of residual demand
elasticity estimation to the brewing industry (1984, 1985, 1988), no
further applications have appeared in the literature (with the exception
of Scheffman and Spiller's market definition application (1987». In
large part, this absence of applications is likely due to an absence of
appropriate data in many industries. Residual demand analysis requires
detailed data on prices, outputs, and firm-specific costs. In the airline
industry, regulatory requirements for reporting of cost and revenue data
are unusually extensive for an industry that is not price regulated.
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Indeed, airline industry data appears likely to be among the best
available data for residual demand analysis.2o
. Until recently, residual demand elasticity estimation using time-
series data in the airline industry would have been impossible because of
the small number of post-deregulation observations. Revenue data are
available only on a quarterly basis, and price regulation was not relaxed
until September, 1980.21 The revenue and output data are ayailable
beginning with the first quarter of 1981; thus 27 quarterly observations
are available before the regulatory approval of the USAir-Piedmont
acquisition.
The two firms competed in about 30 city pairs at the time of the
merger. But the two firms competed in only nine city pairs throughout the
entire sample period. The limited number of observations thus restricts
us to these city pairs. The five routes used were chosen because of their
relatively stable structural characteristics during the sample period.
20Additional applications of the method may be feasible in many
industries, for example in markets for products sold in groceries, partly
because of the increased availability and quality of supermarket UPC
scanner data (for an example of the use of this data, see Katz and
Shapiro, 1984). In some industries, although some of the necessary data
may not be publicly-available, firms in the market may have the necessary
data. Antitrust agencies may subpoena the necessary data during the
course of investigations. It may be possible in some cases to perform the
analysis even under stringent Hart-Scott-Rodino time constraints.
21Prices were not completely deregulated until January 1, 1983.
However, pricing regulations had been relaxed sufficiently that generally
there was substantial unused upward and downward pricing flexibility, and
thus pricing was essentially deregulated, by September, 1980 (Bailey,
Graham, and Kaplan, 1985, chapter 3). Entry deregulation moved at a
faster pace .than pricing deregulation, and was essentially fully
deregulated by January, 1980 (Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan, 1985, chapter
4).
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Most of the data for this analysis was obtained from the databases
of Reuters· Information Services (formerly IP Sharp Associates). which
includes data collected from air carriers by the Department of
Transportation. Revenue and output data come from the Origin and
Destination Data Base (0&0), the cost data from Form 41, and other data
from the Service Segment and T9 data bases. The variables are summarized
in the appendix.
Recall from chapter 2. section II that firm l's residual demand
function is
(3.1)
where Y is a vector of exogenous demand variables, Ware industry-wide
input costs, and Wo are firm-specific costs for the competitors of firm 1.
W
1
' input costs that are specific to firm 1 (i.e. not elements of W or
W
o
), are used in the first-stage regression, Q1-a+l:buWu' The second-stage
regression estimates (4), substituting the fitted values of Q1 from the
first-stage regression for Q1.22 The residual demand function can be
estimated in loglinear form, so that the coefficients on quantities will
be elasticities. Denoting xJ-lnXJ'
(3.2) P1 - 00 + 0lq1 + r1'y + 0l'W + v1
where 01 estimates the residual demand elasticity e1' Similarly, the
partial residual demand function can be estimated by
(3.3)
where 0iJ estimates eiJp'
For each city pair, the demand elasticities from six specifications
are estimated: pre-merger for USAir, pre-merger for Piedmont, post-merger
22This estimation technique is discussed in chapter 2, section II.
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for USAir (Baker & Bresnahan method), post-merger for Piedmont (B&B
method), post-merger for the combined firm (alternative method proposed
in chapter 2, section IV), and for a hypothetical monopolist on the route
(market demand elasticity, also discussed in chapter 2, section IV). In
all the specifications, price is quarterly average revenue, aggregated
across coach and coach discount, and aggregated across one-coupon and two-
coupon itineraries. In the pre-merger and post-merger (B&B-method) cases,
price is calculated for each firm individually. In the alternative-method
post-merger specification, price is calculated as a weighted average price
of the merging firms. In the market specification, price is a weighted
average across all airlines serving the route.
In the pre-merger specification, w includes an industry average
operating expenditures variable (per revenue passenger mile), and/or the
same variable for the major incumbents other than firm 1. Also included
in w is a cost of capital measure and a retail gasoline price index.
Wi1 in the first stage of the pre-merger specification and in the
first stage of the B&B-method post-merger specification are firm 1's
expenses per revenue passenger mile for fuel, pilots and copilots,
personnel expenses, airframe repair labor, engine repair labor, engine
maintenance parts, and airframe maintenance parts for the aircraft it flew
on the route. In the alternative-method post-merger results, wil includes
twelve instruments, the six listed above for both of the merging firms.
In the market specification, wil includes the six variables calculated as
weighted averages of those variables for the incumbent firms.
Demand variables (y) include income measures for the two endpoints
and advertising and promotion expenditures for firm 1. The following
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three subsections provide more details about the price and quantity data,
cost data, and other variables, including discussions of specification
issues.
B. Price and Quantity Data
The 0&0 data are based on carriers' submissions of computer tape
records of 10% of the passenger tickets sold (those with ticket numbers
ending with the digit 0). An itinerary is included in the sample for a
particular city pair (or "directional segment") A to B if the passenger
flew (1) a direct flight from A to B without continuing (or B to A; a
round trip itinerary is treated as equivalent to two one-way tickets), (2)
from A to B, and then on to C, where point C is closer to A than B is to
A (I.e. point B is a "directional break"), or (3) an indirect flight from
A to D to C, if the stop at D does not constitute a directional break.
The 0&0 data are based on actual retail transaction prices, net of
discounts, rather than retail list prices, wholesale prices, or advertised
prices, as some studies estimating demand elasticities and conjectural
variations have used (e.g., Baker and Bresnahan - advertised prices;
L1iang - wholesale list prices).
Some observations are eliminated from the sample (by the data
vendor, Reuters), because they appear likely to be the result of reporting
error.23 Another adjustment is made to the data to account for firms that
report more or less than 10% of their tickets, by correcting the number
230bservations are eliminated from the sample only if (a) non-numeric
fare data is recorded, (b) the itinerary has more than one directional
break, or (c) the recorded fare is more than $1,000 and the revenue per
passenger mile is more than $2. For example, a Baltimore-Tampa ticket
would be eliminated from the sample only if its one-way fare exceeds
$1,684 or its round trip fare exceeds $3,368.
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of passengers based on another source (Form 41 Tl) that collects the
universe of tickets to measure output but not revenue or price. Thus if
a carrier underreports, this method assumes that the fares of the reported
tickets are representative of the fares of the unreported tickets. The
observations eliminated from the sample because of apparent reporting
error, discussed above, ..are corrected for similarly.
Total revenue and quantity of tickets are reported for each quarter,
carrier, and city pair, for each of eight fare categories (first class,
first-class discount, coach, coach discount, other, miscellaneous/unknown,
frequent flyer, and mixed-fare class). For the results presented, the
data were aggregated across coach and coach discount fare categories.
These two categories constitute over 90% of the tickets sold; thus further
aggregation produced similar results. Disaggregating further, to coach
only or coach discount only, appears to create a relatively arbitrary
distinction. Coach and coach discount are not precisely defined and do
not appear to be defined consistently across carriers or across time for
a given carrier.
As well as being reported separately by fare category, the data are
reported separately for one, two, three, and four-or-more "coupons." A
one-coupon ticket is not necessarily a nonstop flight, although all
nonstop flights are one-coupon tickets. The number of "coupons"
corresponds to the number of flight numbers; thus a one-stop flight could
be either a one-coupon or two-coupon flight, depending on whether the
carrier chooses to give separate flight numbers to the two legs. This is
another somewhat arbitrary distinction, although it appears to separate
most nonstops from most one-stops. The results are reported for data
..
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aggregated across one coupon and two coupon. Three coupons and four-or-
more coupons are very few, and are not included.
Baker and Bresnahan (1984, p. 49) suggest that aggregation of data
across products in multiproduct firms may bias results toward elasticity.
They argue that aggregation may dampen the fluctuations in the independent
variables, thus resulting in their explanatory power being suppressed.
Because inverse elasticities are being estimated, a downward bias in the
coefficient would result, toward apparently competitive performance.
Baker and Bresnahan also note that aggregation will yield an average
elasticity and thus may result in overlooking relatively inelastic demand
that may exist for some disaggregated product categories. In airlines,
perhaps aggregation across coach and coach discount could have this bias
if coach passengers have less elastic demand than those passengers who
are able to meet the restrictions on the discounted tickets. It might
appear that focussing on coach (and thus not including coach discount)
might result in more inelastic demand because this group of passengers may
be largely those who are not able to meet the restrictions required for
discounted seats. Disaggregated estimates of individual fare categories
did not yield elasticity estimates that were consistently below or above
the reported results (and the regression fit generally was significantly
poorer). However, this result may be largely because the fare categories
are not defined in an economically meaningful way, rather than that
airlines have not successfully price discriminated.
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C. Cost Data
As discussed in chapter 2, section II, residual demand est.imation
requires firm-specific cost data in order to identify firm-level residual
demand curves. An abundance of firm-specific cost data is available for
the airline industry; accordingly it is not necessary to resort to the use
of proxies such as firms' capacity, as in Baker and Bresnahan's brewing
industry applications (1985, 1988). The cost data from Form 41 is
reported by each firm on a quarterly basis, for numerous categories of
costs (see table 3.2 below; other cost variables are also available),
separately for each type of aircraft flown (DC9-l0, DC9-30, 727-100, 727-
200, etc.). The cost data are not specific to the particular city-pair
markets being served. But because of the mobility of capital in this
industry, much of the cost of operating a given type of aircraft by a
given carrier in a given quarter should not be expected to vary
dramatically across city pairs.
In order for a firm's residual demand equation to be identified, its
costs must shift independently of other firms' costs. Airline costs
appear relatively likely to satisfy this criterion,. in part because
competing carriers often use different aircraft to fly the same routes,
and these aircraft have significantly different fuel, crew, and
maintenance requirements. For example, on the Baltimore-Tampa route,
Piedmont flew DC9-30s almost solely, throughout the sample period, while
USAir flew primarily 737s.24 Even when competing airlines use the same
24It may appear surprising that two competing carriers would persist
in the long run in flying different aircraft on the same city pair,
because significantly different degrees of fuel efficiency and passenger
capacity would appear to imply that a particular aircraft model should be
(continued .•.)
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type of aircraft, their costs differ due to different compensation of
flight crew and maintenance personnel, different number of crew per
aircraft, different number of seats per aircraft, and other factors.
However, it is not absolute differences across competitors in components
of marginal costs, but independent shifting of these variables that is
required to identify residual demand functions. Certain cost variables,
such as fuel, may be highly correlated across carriers. The following
table shows the lack of correlation between the components of USAir's and
Piedmont's costs used as instruments, for the aircraft they flew on
Baltimore-Tampa during the sample period. This lack of correlation
suggests that the use of these variables as instruments in the residual
demand estimation should identify firm-level demand.
Table 3.2: Cross-Carrier Cost-Component Correlation Coefficients
USAir DC9-30 - Piedmont 737-200
(real costs per revenue passenger mile)
fuel .98
pilots-copilots .44
personnel expenses .26
airframe repair labor .16
engine repair labor .01
engine maintenance parts .01
airframe maintenance parts .44
It is not immediately clear which components of airlines' costs
should be considered important components of the marginal cost that is
24 ( ••• continued)
optimal on a particular route. One possible explanation is that carriers
may base their choice of aircraft models on their efficiency on a certain
range of route distances, and one of the carriers tended to fly on longer
routes. Scale economies of purchasing and/or maintenance of aircraft may
then offset the efficiencies of selecting the optimal aircraft for each
individual route.
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relevant for firms' pricing decisions. The incremental cost of each
additional passenger on an already-scheduled flight should be quite low,
including only the costs of a small amount of fuel to carry the additional
weight of the passenger and baggage, one additional meal or snack, and
additional baggage handling and ticketing. But the data are aggregated
well beyond the level of the incremental passenger. Observations of
price, output, and costs are quarterly. Incumbent carriers may be able
to divert aircraft relatively easily across many city pairs over a
quarterly time horizon, and thus aircraft operating expenses such as fuel,
crew, and equipment maintenance expenses can be considered to be relevant
marginal costs.
Estimation of a firm's residual demand elasticity requires that its
firm-specific costs be included as instrumental variables in the first
stage regression and its competitors' costs as exogenous variables in the
second stage. The second-stage cost variables are aggregated into a total
expenditure variable that is an aggregate of the component costs discussed
above, for each competitor for the aircraft flown by that competitor on
that route. Thus for example on Baltimore-Tampa, USAir's residual demand
equation includes total operating expenditures per revenue passenger mile
for Piedmont's 737-200s, Delta's 727-200s, and Eastern's 727-200s. On
routes on which there were not sizable incumbents, an industry aggregate
cost variable was constructed to represent potential entrants' costs.
Other possible industry cost variables, including indices of landing fees,
food expenditures, and advertising expenses did not prove to be
significant and are not included in the reported regressions.
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In the B&B-method post-merger specifications, the cost variables are
the same as in the pre-merger specification. But in the alternative-
method post-merger results, both USAir' s and Piedmont's costs are included
as instruments in the first stage, because the method aggregates prices
and quantities across the merger partners. The costs only for the
competitors other than the merger partners is included in the second stage
of this specification. For the "market" specification, price and quantity
are aggregated across all the incumbents, so all airline costs appear as
instruments in the first stage only.
As Froeb and Werden illustrate (1990, p. 15), if the variance of the
cost shifters constitutes a small proportion of the variance of the firm's
marginal cost, and/or if the cost shifters are highly correlated across
firms, the variance of the instrumental variables estimator will be high.
Table 3.2 illustrates that the latter issue does not appear to raise a
problem in this case, but the former problem may be more difficult to
detect. If the cost shifters constitute a high proportion of marginal
cost, the problem should be unlikely. In this case, the cost shifters
constitute about 70% of non-overhead expenses (Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan,
1985, p. 49). However, it could be the case that omitted cost shifters,
though they constitute a small percentage of marginal cost, constitute a
relatively high percentage of firm-specific variance in marginal cost.
Variables such as landing fees, reservation and sales expenses, and the
implicit rental value of aircraft and gates are not included. However,
these variables appear relatively unlikely to be the source of a high
proportion of firm-specific variance in marginal cost. Landing fees
should be equivalent for competitors on a given route, reservation and
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sales are performed very similarly across the industry, and a relatively
efficient secondary market for aircraft and a market for options to buy
aircraft imply that the implicit rental value of aircraft should not
produce much firm-specific cost variance.
Another cost variable included is the cost of capital, Moody's index
of yields on Baa corporate bonds. In addition, on the two shorter routes,
Memphis-Nashville and Washington-Norfolk, the retail gasoline component
of the Consumer Price Index is included.
D. Other Variables
Other variables in the regressions include income, advertising,
quarterly dummies and a time-trend dummy. The income variable is the
simple sum of personal income in the two metropolitan areas that are the
endpoints of the city pair. The measure is total income, not per capita
income. Constructing the variable this way allows it to account both for
per capita income growth and for population growth. While population and
per capita income may not affect airline demand proportionally,
regressions run with these two variables specified separately did not
significantly affect the results; thus they were combined in this way to
conserve degrees of freedom. Advertising expenditures are included, but
they are reported only nationally for each carrier, and thus are not
specific to the individual markets. Quarterly dummies are included to
control for seasonal variations in demand.
Dummy variables are included in some of the specifications to
account for short-term shocks to the structure of competition on the
individual routes. On Baltimore-Tampa, a dummy is included for the period
preceding Piedmont's introduction of nonstop service on that route in
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1QS3. On Baltimore-Orlando, a dummy is included for the three-quarter
period in which World Airways entered the route and gained up to a 25%
share. Similarly, a dummy is included for Boston-Norfolk for Eastern's
five-quarter presence, during which it gained a market share of up to lSi.
Because we are estimating residual demand elasticities for
individual city pairs, it may appear that we implicitly assume that city
pairs are relevant geographic markets (as defined in the Merger
Guidelines, 1984, section 2.3). It also may appear that we implicitly
assume that commercial air travel is a relevant product market. While the
demand characteristics of city pairs in many instances may be supportive
of a relevant city-pair market, supply substitutability may imply that a
broader geographic market is more appropriate in many instances. While
excluding relevant competition will bias market concentration measures,
there is no a priori reason to expect residual demand estimates to be
biased, because the effect of any form of competition should be reflected
implicitly in the demand elasticities (as discussed in chapter 2, section
III) .
V. Results
A. General Discussion
Regression coefficients for thirty regressions (six for each of the
five routes), t-statistics, and market concentration data are reported in
table 3.3. The complete regression results are reported in the appendix.
The coefficients are reported as negative inverse residual demand
elasticities and thus are proxies for the Lerner index (L--1/e), as
discussed in chapter 2, section III. Results are reported for pre-merger
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specifications for each firm. for post-merger specifications based on the
B&B method and the alternative proposed method, and for a market (I.e.
hypothetical monopolist) specification.
On the pre-merger results. note that low t-statistics (particularly
on Memphis-Nashville) indicate that quantity is ,not significant in
explaining price. thus implying a highly elastic residual demand function.
Post-merger results are given for both the Baker and Bresnahan (B&B)
method. discussed in chapter 2. section IV.A. and an alternative method
proposed in chapter 2. section IV.B. Recall that the B&B method estimates
partial residual demand equations for each of the two merging firms and
sums the own- and cross-partial residual demand elasticities estimated in
each equation to yield an estimate of the post-merger demand elasticity.
Thus their method results in separate post-merger results for each firm
while the alternative method estimates a single post-merger result for the
combined firm. For the B&B-method results. first the sum is reported.
then the own- and cross-partial terms that were added to calculate the
post-merger result. For example. the post-merger result for USAir on
Baltimore-Orlando is .61. the sum of the own-partial (.56) and cross-
partial (.05) elasticities. The alternative method estimates the residual
demand elasticity for the weighted average price and total quantity of the
merging firms.
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TABIE 3.3
MEMPHIS' BOSTON' WASHINGTON' BALTIMORE' BALTIMORE'NASHVILLE NORFOLK NORFOLK TAMPA ORLANOO
L··lIePREMERGERUSAIR '.05 (0.1) . .14 (2.1) .09 (2.9) .20 (2.5) .58 (4.0)PIEDMONT '.09 (0.6) .43 (3.7) .06 (0.3) .20 (1.5) .03 (0.2)POSTMERGERB&8 MethodUSAIR .05 .61 .11 .25 .61
own '.06 (0.8) .13 (4.0) .09 (2.7) .15 (1.3) .56 (3.9)eros. .10 (1.0) .48 (7.4) .02 (0.3) .10 (0.6) .05 (0.4)PIEOMONT ••09 .63 .07 .19 .16own .02 (0.4) .53 (4.8) .04 (0.2) .18 (0.8) ••02 (0.2)eros. '.12 (0.8) .10 (2.3) .03 (0.6) .01 (0.1) .18 (2.3)Alt Method '.05 (0.5) .68 (4.9) .10 (5.2) .23 (1.4) .44 (4.2)
MARKET .43 (3.6) .83 (5.6) .25 (3.1) .41 (2.3) .86 (4.3)
HHI
PREMERGER 3339 4859 4268 2825 2963INCREASE 182 3250 3534 1826 960POSTMERGER 3521 8109 7802 4701 3923
MARKET SHARES
USAIR US .07 US .25 US .57 US .30 US .20PIEDMONT PI .13 PI .65 PI .31 PI .38 PI .24OTHER NW .40 EA .03 UA .07 EA .19 EA .44
AM .39 TW .03 DL .11 DL .09
Market power increases can be inferred by the significance of the
cross-partial term in addition to the degree to which the sum of the
cross-partial- and the own-elasticities (L.e. the reported post-merger
result) exceeds the pre-merger residual demand elasticity. An
insignificant cross-partial term indicates that the pricing behavior of
the one firm is not affected by the pricing behavior of the other and thus
that other factors (e.g., other competitors, the threat of entry, costs,
highly elastic consumer demand) are the critical constraints on the firm's
pricing.
After the premerger and postmerger results, the "market" or
"hypothetical monopolist' sn demand elasticity is presented. This is
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estimated using the same method as the combined post-merger estimates, the
price being the weighted average price, in this case across all
competitors on the route, and the quantity being the total number of
carriers on the route.
Note that the Herfindah1 indices (HHls) on all the routes are in the
Merger Guidelines' "highly concentrated" range (above 1800, post-merger).
The HHI increases reSUlting from the merger also fall in the Guidelines'
upper range (above 100). The Guidelines state that "only in extraordinary
circumstances" will a merger be considered not likely to lessen
competition if both the level and increase in market power are in the
upper range (1984, section 3.11). But city-pair routes may not constitute
relevant markets as defined in the Merger Guidelines; thus application of
Guidelines' thresholds to these figures may be inappropriate. Although
these routes all have market concentration in the Guidelines' upper range,
a significant degree of variation in market concentration exists across
the routes, both with respect to the level (a range of 3500-8100) and the
increase (a range of 180-3500) in the HHI brought about by the merger.
The concentration figures are averages over the time series, and thus do
not necessarily reflect the market concentration that existed at the time
of the merger. For example, if a carrier had a thirty percent share
during one-third of the sample period then exited, its share appears as
ten percent.
The results are reported for regressions run on data aggregated
across coach and coach discount fare categories, and across one-coupon and
two-coupon flights. These categories are defined, and aggregation across
them discussed, in section IV.B above.
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In time-series regression analysis, autocorrelation, the correlation
of error terms, can arise and affect the efficiency of the estimators,
thus biasing standard errors downward. The Durbin-Watson statistics
reported in the appendix indicate that autocorrelation does not appear to
be a problem in these regressions. The null hypothesis of no
autocorrelation cannot be rejected for any of the specifications. For the
specifications with the lowest Durbin-Watson statistics, the Cochrane-
Orcutt procedure was run and did not generate notably different results.
Note that the inclusion of a time-trend variable and the absence of lagged
dependent variables mitigate potential autocorrelation problems.
B. Comparisons of Pre-merger, Post-merger, and Market Demand Elasticities
For each route, estimated pre-merger market power is less than or
equal to estimated post-merger market power, and estimated post-merger
market power is less than the estimated market power of the hypothetical
monopolist. Thus it appears that the estimation technique may have
successfully distinguished among the three distinct levels of demand
elasticities. Neither of the alternative methods of making post-merger
inferences distinguishes itself as superior to the other. The "combined"
post-merger results appear to be very close to weighted averages of the
firm-specific B&B-method post-merger results.
The estimates of the market power of the hypothetical monopolist
provide an estimate of the maximum degree of market power that could be
generated on each route. For example, on Washington-Norfolk, where even
a monopolist would be able to price at only 25% above marginal cost,
mergers provide much less potential threat to consumer welfare than
mergers on routes in which the hypothetical monopolist could price 80% or
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more above marginal cost. Because in many industries cost data is not
firm-specific, often only market demand elasticities can be estimated.
In these instances, estimates of market demand elasticity can still
provide useful estimates of the maximum market power that could be
created. However, this suggests that results indicating substantial
market power, such as those of Baker and Bresnahan, could be biased
because a lack of firm-specific data may imply that we are erroneously
estimating market demand elasticity rather than firm-specific residual
demand elasticity.
On the Memphis-Nashville route, the coefficients are negative, but
they are near zero, and their t-statistics are very low, suggesting a flat
residual demand curve. The cross-partial coefficients also are not
significant, suggesting that the merger will not create market power on
this route. This result is not surprising because the market shares of
USAir and Piedmont are low (7% and 13% respectively, although these
figures still place the merger within the Guidelines' upper range) and the
relatively short distance of the route25 implies that air travel may face
significant competition from ground travel.
Boston-Norfolk, on the other hand, exhibits significant market power
for both firms premerger and a relatively strong market power increase due
to the merger, with the estimated post-merger Lerner index approaching
that of the hypothetical monopolist. The highly significant cross-partial
coefficients on this route suggest that the presence of the other carrier
25The driving distances of the routes are Memphis-Nashville - 209
miles, Boston-Norfolk - 581 miles, Washington-Norfolk 189 miles,
Baltimore-Tampa - 950 miles, Baltimore-Orlando - 892 miles.
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was a substantial constraint on USAir's and Piedmont's pricing on this
route. The two firms combined market share on the route is 90 percent.
Washington-Norfolk exhibits a small degree of pre-merger market
power (6-9% Lerner indices). and the coefficient for USAir is significant
while the one for Piedmont is not. The post-merger estimates exceed the
pre-merger estimates but only slightly. with very low t-values on the
cross-partial coefficients. The results indicating relatively competitive
performance in the presence of high market concentration may be due in
part to competition from ground travel. the presence of United and TWA
with small market shares. and/or the threat of entry. However. we might
expect that entry into slot-constrained Washington-National Airport would
be relatively difficult. while the Washington-Norfolk results are highly
competitive. Apparently. the existing fringe competitors and ground
travel competition are sufficient to maintain relatively competitive
pricing even in the presence of what may be substantial entry barriers.
On Baltimore-Tampa. both USAir and Piedmont appear to be able to
price about 20% above marginal cost, and the merger does not appear to
increase their market power significantly, in spite of an HHI increase of
over 1800.
On Baltimore-Orlando. USAir appears to have significant market power
while Piedmont does not. The coefficients suggest that Piedmont will gain
significant market power from the merger but that USAir will not. These
results may appear anomalous because one might expect that two competitors
with similar market shares (20 and 24%) should have similar degrees of
market power (as is the case, for example. on Baltimore-Tampa). As it
turns out, the discrepancy may be produced at least in part by the fact
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that USAir flew about 93% of its passengers on this route nonstop, while
Piedmont flew 6S% of its passengers nonstop. Because Piedmont directed
many of its passengers through Charlotte on this route, its costs likely
were relatively high, and thus it should be expected to command a lower
average markup than its rival. Indeed, for flights that were fully
booked, the cost to Piedmont of a passenger flying from Baltimore to
Orlando through Charlotte includes the opportunity cost due to that
passenger's displacing two alternative passengers, one from Baltimore to
Charlotte and another from Charlotte to Orlando. (For a pricing model
that incorporates the effects of this form of supply substitution, see
K1eit and Maynes, 1990.)
The Boston-Norfolk results exhibit a similar discrepancy in the
residual demand elasticities, but in this case it is Piedmont that has the
relatively high markup. Just as in the previous case, it turns out that
the carrier with the more elastic demand is also the carrier that flew a
relatively higher proportion of one-stop flights on the route. Piedmont
flew 86% of its flights direct and USAir flew 73% of its flights direct.
In addition, on this route Piedmont had a much greater market share than
USAir (65% vs. 25%). Piedmont's higher market share suggests that it
likely offered more flights per day on average than USAir. If Piedmont
offered several flights per day and USAir were somehow limited to offering
only one or two flights per day on this route, Piedmont's preferable
product selection may have enabled it to charge somewhat higher prices
than USAir. However, these effects may not explain fully the differences
in the coefficients.
so
~-----~---~~-----
These apparent asymmetries between competitors raise some doubt
about the degree to which the data conform to the symmetry assumption
required by the methods used to calculate post-merger and market demand
elasticities (discussed in chapter 2, section IV). At first glance, it
may appear that the symmetric competition assumption would be reasonable
in the airline industry. Though certainly not homogeneous, two
competitors' air travel services from city a to city b in many cases do
not appear to be characterized by substantial net advantages for one of
the competitors. However, in many cases, one carrier offers a package of
services that may be preferred by a significant proportion of customers,
such as more departures, preferable departure times, better on-time
performance, better in-flight services, and shorter layovers. This
carrier may then face more inelastic demand than its competitors.
Accordingly, 61fi/SPz-S1fz/SP1 may not be satisfied. The direction and
magnitude of any bias that may be introduced by this asymmetry is not
clear.
C. Comparisons Across the Five Routes
The empirical method estimates only the level of market power; it
does not explain the causal factors leading to the existence of market
power. The sources of differences in market power often may be readily
apparent, for example differing degrees of market concentration. However,
in some cases apparent differences in competitive performance may appear
to be anomalies, because we often may have limited information about
differences in entry conditions and other structural characteristics of
markets. It is difficult to assess the extent to which apparent anomalies
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result from data and specification problems or from market power sources
that are not readily apparent.
Comparisons across markets are subject to less ambiguity in the
current case, in which we are comparing across geographic markets within
a given product market, than in cases in which comparisons across product
markets are attempted, because many structural characteristics should be
expected to be similar across the cross-section. However, substantial
unobserved differences in structural characteristics still may exist.
While many of the costs of airlines will be similar across routes,
significant variations in competitive performance across airline routes
may result from differences in landing fees, gate and slot allocations,
demand characteristics, and other route-, airline-, and airport-specific
factors. In addition, in this case there are only five cross-section
observations from which to make comparisons. However, the fact that many
of the variations in the results across routes appear to result from
observed structural differences provides some confirmation of the
soundness of the results.
Note that the estimated market demand elasticity on the two shorter
routes (MemphiS-Nashville and Washington-Norfolk) indicates that a
monopolist on these routes would have less ability to raise prices than
a monopolist on longer routes, perhaps in large part because of
competition from ground travel.
increase is lowest on the two
In addition, the estimated market power
short routes (Memphis-Nashville and
Washington-Norfolk) and highest on a longer route with a relatively high
increase in market concentration (Boston-Norfolk).
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Washington-Norfolk results provide an interesting contrast to the
Memphis-Nashville and Boston-Norfolk results. Because the route distance
is about the same as that of Memphis-Nashville, the degree of competition
from ground travel should be comparable. Yet the market concentration
figures are very similar to those on Boston-Norfolk, which exhibited a
significant market power increase. Thus it appears that competition from
ground travel may prevent anticompetitive pricing on this short route in
spite of high market concentration.
The results in Memphis-Nashville and Baltimore-Tampa suggest that
the Merger Guidelines' HHI thresholds may be unreasonably low, because no
market power appears to be produced by the merger on either of the two
routes, despite market concentration levels and increases that are well
into the Guidelines' upper ranges. Further, since estimated market power
on the five routes is not a strictly increasing function of market
concentration, the results suggest that strict application of HHI
thresholds may be inappropriate even within a given product market, let
alone across product markets. Of course, such conclusions are premature
given the limited scope of this study, but perhaps further appl1cations
will cast further light on the reasonableness of the Guidelines'
thresholds.
D. Route Spinoffs and Efficiency Gains
One possible remedy for airline mergers that are found to be
anticompetitive is to require spinoffs of gates and slots in the overlap
markets. However, in the deregulated airline industry airlines do not
have rights to individual routes, so routes cannot be spun off, only gates
and slots can be. Yet the analysis points to possible anticompetitive
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problems on specific routes, not at specific airports. In any event, we
can simulate a route spinoff by simulating an alternative merger with
another incumbent on the route. In policy applications, analysis might
find that a number of routes from a given airport raise competitive
concerns and that a spinoff of gates from one of the incumbents may
provide opportunities for other carriers to compete on the problem routes,
although it would not guarantee that the recipients of the gates would
compete on those routes. The simulation assumes that we can spin off
specific routes, because the simulation is equivalent to the simulation
of a merger on that route. The estimated market power effect of the
spinoff can then be compared to the estimated effect of the merger.
Incumbents with market shares smaller than the merging firms may be
the most obvious candidates for spinoffs. However, in order to simulate
a spinoff, the firms must have competed long enough to accumulate enough
observations to perform the analysis. Many firms with small market shares
may not have competed throughout the sample period, in which case such
simulations often may'not be possible. In the current application, we
estimated a significant market power increase on two routes, and the
competitors with smaller market shares than USAir and Piedmont did not
compete throughout the sample period. Thus in this case, spinoff
simulation is not possible.
Chapter 2, section 5 derives a formula for estimating the critical
level of efficiency gain that would prevent the post-merger price from
exceeding the pre-merger price:
(3.4) ~1~11P12p
1+e1
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Applying this formula to the Boston-Norfolk route, the critical
reduction in marginal cost for USAir is 41% and for Piedmont is 14%. The
only other statistically significant market power increase is for Piedmont
on Baltimore-Orlando. The critical efficiency gain in this case is 13%.
While these figures appear high, efficiencies realized by the merger may
have been spread across all overlap routes, including routes with little
or no anticompetitive effect, such as Memphis-Nashville. If such is the
case, the critical level of efficiency gain would be much lower. For
example, if we assume that the estimated competitive effects on the five
routes are representative of the routes for which an efficiency gain also
will result from the merger, a 7% reduction in marginal cost would be
sufficient to prevent an increase in average price.28 Of course, a much
smaller efficiency gain would be sufficient to offset the deadweight loss
from the price increases. Further, reductions in fixed costs also may
result and would add to total surplus, but would not affect pricing.
VI. Conclusion
Residual demand elasticities were estimated at the pre-merger, post-
merger, and market level for five routes on which USAir and Piedmont
competed prior to merging in 1987. These results suggest that a
significant degree of market power existed on some routes prior to the
merger and that increased market power appears likely to result from the
merger on some routes. Other routes exhibited highly elastic residual
demand in spite of high levels of market concentration. Because of the
26This also assumes that each of the routes handle the same number of .
passengers: .07-(.41+.14+.13)/10.
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limited scope of this study, it would be inappropriate to draw conclusions
from the~e results about the net effects of the merger on the numerous
routes affected, or on the effects of airline mergers generally. As the
results suggest, competitive performance may vary considerably across
routes.
The results do suggest that residual demand analysis can provide
significant insights about competition that other analytical methods such
as structure-performance analysis and the DOJ-Merger-Guidelines approach
often may be unable to provide. This point raises the question of the
potential usefulness of residual demand analysis for antitrust policy and
enforcement. The stringent data requirements and the requirement of
independent shifts of firm-specific cost components necessarily imply that
the method could be used in only a small minority of cases, and thus could
act only as a complement not a substitute for the Merger Guidelines'
methodology.
Even if the methodology were more widely applicable, it is unlikely
that it could ever replace the Guidelines method. Yhile residual demand
estimation synthesizes the relevant factors that affect competition into
a single statistic, it is unlikely that enforcement officials would ever
rely on such a statistic absent support in the form of descriptions of the
observable variables that affect competition in a given market. The
Merger Guidelines approach provides such relevant descriptive information
about an industry.
The Guidelines approach is standardized, generally applicable, and
based in large part on sound economic theory. However, it often is not
applicable in a rigorous manner, and thus objective applications of the
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method can yield opposite conclusions. For example. the data necessary
to apply rigorously the Guidelines' "5% test" for defining geographic and
product markets often is not available. and thus often more than one
market definition is consistent with available information. Market
concentration figures in these alternative proposed markets can vary
dramatically and thus yield opposing conclusions about the likely
competitive effects of a merger. Similarly there often is substantial
disagreement about the conditions of entry and their implications for
competitive performance in a given industry. In cases such as these where
standard analysis yields ambiguous results. residual demand analysis may
have its greatest potential value.
Further. the benefits of an application of residual demand analysis
may significantly exceed the value of the results in the individual case
for which they are estimated. Applications of the method will add to the
understanding of the method useful in future applications. to the
understanding of competition in the industry useful outside of the
immediate application. and to the understanding of competition issues and
resulting policy implications more generally.
To the extent that residual demand estimates appear inconsistent
with directly observable industry variables. and this inconsistency
persists across a number of applications. the inconsistency may lead us
to question commonly held beliefs about the competitive importance of
those industry variables. Similarly. results may suggest that certain
industry variables be given greater or lesser weight in our analyses than
they commonly have been given in the past. Economic theory does not
provide unambiguous guidance. and the Guidelines do not suggest any rules •
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for determining the appropriate weights to be placed on market
concentration measures and the numerous other potentially relevant
observable market variables in judging the competitive significance of
mergers.
Applications of the methodology are not without costs. In cases in
which an existing appropriate data set is available at low marginal cost
(e.g., the airline industry), it may be worthwhile to apply the method in
most cases. However, the costs of generating a data set may be high in
some cases, and may outweigh the benefits from a single estimation of
residual demand elasticities. The opportunities for applications that are
likely to yield net benefits may be increasing due to the increased
availability. and quality of upe scanner data. Thus with improvements in
data sources, improvements in residual demand elasticity estimation
methodology, and a greater understanding of the potential value of the
methodology, further applications may be judged to be increasingly
productive.
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APPENDIX
Dependent Variable
PRICE - log real average revenue aggregated across coach, coach discount,
one coupon and two coupons. For the first four specifications for each
route, this variable is firm specific; for the fifth specification
("combined"), this variable is a weighted average for USAir and Piedmont;
for the last specification ("market"), this variable is a weighted average
for all carriers on the route.
Independent Variables
QUANT - log number of passengers aggregated across coach, coach discount,
one coupon and two coupons; for the first four specifications for each
route, this variable is firm specific; for the fifth specification ("alt
method"), this variable is the sum of the quantities of USAir and
Piedmont; for the last specification ("market"), this variable is the sum
of the quantities of all carriers on the route.
AVCOST - log real total operating expenditures per revenue passenger mile
INT. RATE - log real cost of capital - Moody's Index of Baa bond yields
INCOME - log real total personal income for the two endpoint metro areas
ADV - log real national advertising and promotion expenses
GASPRICE - log real retail gasoline component of the Consumer Price Index
TIME - quarters 1-27
QTR2-4 - quarterly dummies
DUMP I - dummy variable for first eight quarters preceding Piedmont's
introduction of nonnstop service on Baltimore-Tampa
DUMWO - dummy variable for three quarters in which World Airways competed
on Baltimore-Orlando
DUMEA - dummy for five quarter presence of Eastern Airlines on Boston-
Norfolk
DUMTW - dummy for TWA's entry into Washington-Norfolk in the twentieth
quarter
DUMUA - dummy for United's entry into Washington-Norfolk in the twenty-
third quarter
Instrumental Variables
LRFUR - log real fuel cost per revenue passenger mile (rpm)
LRPCR - log real pilot and copilot salaries per rpm
LRPER - log real personnel expenses per rpm
LRMER - log real engine repair materials per rpm
LRMAR - log real airframe repair materials per rpm
LRLER - log real engine repair labor per rpm
LRLAR - log real airframe repair labor per rpm
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MEMPHIS-NASHVILLE
VARIABLE USAIR USAIR PIED PIED CCt1B MKT
PRE POST PRE POST POST
QUANT-US .05 .06 .12(.72) (.84) (.81)
QUANT-PI -.10 .09 -.02
(-1.03) (.66) (-.39)
QUANT-CCt1B .05
(.53)
QUANT-MKT -.43
(-3.64)
AVCOST-MKT -.01 -.41 .26 .37 .21(-.03) (-.61) (.38) (.S1) (.48)
AVCOST-AH -.12 .07 .19 .09 .10(-.32) (.16) (.46) (.19) (.43)
AVCOST-PI .02 -.02
(.06) (-.06)
AVCOST-US -.28 -.24
(-.84) (-.67)
INT. RATE -.07 -.28 -.03 .OS -.14 -.29(-.20) (-.72) (-.07) (.12) (-.67) (-1.66)
INCCH: -2.35 -.39 -2.48 -3.21 -2.10 -1.09(-1.99) (-.17) (-.89) (-1.01) (-1.60) (-1.6S)
ADV-PI .02 .04 .04(.20) (.33) (.54)
ADV-US -.10 -.10 -.21(-.80) (-.7S) (-2.3S)
QTR2 .02 .01 .03 .04 .09 .03(.18) (.07) (.46) r. S4) (1.67) (1.29)
QTR3 .01 .03 .02) .02 .05 .02(,13) (.36) (.29) (.25) (1.02) (.90)
QTR4 -.01 .01 -.02 -.03 .01 -.07(-.13) (.22) (-.41) (-.48) (.18) (-2.44)
TIME .03 .00 .03 .04 .03 .01(1.47) (-.13) (.71) (.86) (1.34) (1.97)
GASPRICE .22 .48 .09 .04 .00 .21
(.U) (.85) (.19) (.07) (-.01) (1.29)
REPUBDUM .34 .34 .25 .28 .32 .21(9.94) (9.91) (4.81) (4.43) (9.42) (7.97)
OW 2.4 2.3 1.6 1.7 2.2 1.8
R-SQUARE .93 .93 .91 .91 .95 .92
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BOSTON-NORFOLK
VAlUABLE USAIR USAIR PIED PIED COMB MKT
PRE POST PRE POST POST
QUANT-US -.14 -.13 -.10
(-2.05) (-4.02) (-2.25)
QUANT-PI -.48 -.43 -.53
(-7.35) (-3.71) (-4.75)
QUANT-COMB -.68
(-4.85)
QUANT-MKT -.83
(-5.57)
AVCOST-MK .20 .08 .32 .28 .42(.68) (.56) (1.22) (1.18) (2.12)
AVCOST-PI 1.47 .63
(4.13) (3.15)
AVCOST-US -.07 .12
(-.30) (.53)
AnV-PI -.12 -.07 -.05
(-1.46) (-.93) (-.71)
AnV-US .28 .14 -.02(2.00) (1.97) (-.26)
INT. RATE -1.56 -.17 .09 .20 .13 .20
(-4.55) (-.69) (.28) (.67) (.47) (.81)
INCOME -.12 -.65 -1.12 -1.15 -1.63 -1.38(-.07) (-.78) (-.92) (-1.08) (-1.28) (-1.01)
QTR2 .32 .34 .15 .27 .29 .32(3.36) (7.55) (2.44) (3.55) (3.84) (4.42)
QTR3 .23 .27 .03 .15 .17 .25(2.16) (5.25) (.33) (1.66) (1.88) (2.80)
QTR4 .14 .18 -.02 .08 .07 .13(1.03) (2.97) (-.21) (.86) (.68) (1.25)
TIME -.02 .02 .04 .04 .04 .03(-1.14) (1.63) (2.33) (2.87) (2.60) (1.79)
DUMEA -.12 -.15 -.16 -.13 -.10 .00(-2.00) (-S~41) (-3.81) (-3.56) (-2.57) (.04)
OW 1.3 2.2 1.9 2.2 2.5 1.6
R-SQUARE .70 .94 .85 .89 .85 .77
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WASHINGTON-NORFOLK
VARIABLE PIED PIED UBAIR UBAIR COMB HKT
PRE POST PRE POST POST
QUANT-US -.03 -.09 -.09
(-.57) (-2.89) (-2.74)
QUANT-PI -.06 -.04 -.02(-.32) (-.19) (-.30)
QUANT-COMB -.10
(-5.23)
QUANT-HKT -.25
(-3.14)
AVCOST-PI .15 .18
( .41) (.45)
AVCOSTUS -.81 -.59
(-1.77) (-.95)
INT. RATE .82 .59 .52 .56 .48 .60(1.27) (.66) (1.73) (1.60) (2.16) (2.18)
ADV-PI .13 .12 .07(.75) (.69) (.74)
ADV-US .10 .11 .12
(.80) (.80) (1.45)
GASPRICE .67 .50 -.59 -.64 .35 .16(.84) (.63) (-1.35) (-1.43) (.83) (.42)
TIME -.01 -.02 .01 .00 .02 .03(-.29) (-.51) (.21) (.16) (1.11) (1.39)
QTR2 -.17 -.11 .03 .04 -.01 -.01(1.93) (-.88) (.40) (.47) (-.31) (-.18)
QTR3 -.05 .00 .03 .04 .04 -.02(-.60) (-.04) (.48) (.54) (.87) (-.39)
QTR4 -.07 -.04 .03 .03 .00 -.03(-.89) (-.32) (.47) (.49) (-.02) (-.65)
INCCME 1.62 1.88 -1.34 -1.18 -1.86 -1.45(.64) (.74) (-.78) (-.67) (-1.37) (-1.07)
DUMl'W -.21 -.19 .04 .02 -.02 .01(1.26) (-1.01) (.69) (.30) (-.38) (.20)
DUMUA .10 .02 -.15 -.16 .07 .15(.44) (.07) (-.95) (-1.01) (.52) (1.38)
DW 2.4 2.4 1.2 1.2 1.8 1.11
R-SQUARE .88 .88 .58 .57 .85 .71
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BALTIMORE-TAMPA
VARIABLE USAIR USAIR PIED PIED COMB MKT
PRE POST PRE POST POST
QUANT-US -.20 -.15 -.01
(-2.53) (-1.34) (-.09)
QUANT-PI -.10 -.20 -.18
(-.60) (-1.49) (-.76)
QUANT-COMB -.23
(-1.41)
QUANT-MKT -.41
(-2.29)
AVCOST-PI .27 .29
(..50) (.50)
AVCOST-US .38 .35
(.76) (.58)
AVCOST-EA -1.29 -.98 -.61 -.70 -.48 -.52(-2..52) (-1.29) (-1.43) (-.67) (-1.16) (-1..54)
AVCOST-DL 1.57 1.21 .64 .78 .84 .68(2.84) (1.42) (1.21) (.54) (1.96) (1.89)
INT. RATE .05 .27 1.41 1.38 .87 .81(.12) (.45) (3.73) (2.52) (1.98) (3.08)
AnV-PI .04 .05 -.07(.34) (.28) (-..53)
AnV-US .05 .03 -.10(.32) (.17) (-.68)
INCOME 7.15 5.78 -.62 -.25 5.66 3.71(2.85) (1.63) (-.25) (-.0.5) (2.78) (2.34)
QTR2 .15 .11 .02 .03 .05 .00(1.51) (.98) (.31) (.27) (.77) (.02)
QTR3 .02 -.01 -.02 -.01 -.08 -.11(.28) (-.13) (-.25) (-.09) (-.85) (-1.78)
QTR4 .02 .00 .04 .011 -.03 -.05(.28) (.03) (.57) (..53) (-.62) -1.07)
TIME -.05 -.03 .07 .08 -.01 .00(-2.38) (-..56) (2.14) (.83) (-.32) (.05)
DUMPI .08 -.05 -.25 -.23 -.05 -.07(.07) (-.25) (-1.72) (-.88) (-..56) (-.79)
DW 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.6
R-SQUARE .82 .81 .72 .72 .81 .87
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BALTIMORE-ORLANDO
VARIABLE USAIR USAIR PIED PIED COMB MKT
PRE POST PRE POST POST
QUANT-US -.58 -.56 -.18
(-4.04) (-3.85) (-2.28)
QUANT-PI -.05 -.03 .02
(-.40) (-.20) (.19)
QUANT-COMB -.44
(-4.23)
QUANT-MKT -.86
(-4.27)
AVCOST-PI .31 .18
(.48 (.25)
AVCOST-US .90 .65
(1.81) (1.41)
AVCOST-EA .02 .03 .05 .08 -.08
(.03) (.04) (.10) (.19) (-.18)
AVCOST-DL .65 .61 -.06 .06 .47
(1.10) (1.00) (-.11) (.13) (1.13)
INT. RATE -.23 -.21 .44 .65 .22 -.35(-.46) (-.42) (.97) u. 53) (.71) (-.80)
INCOME-B -15.31 -13.13 4.39 -5.62 -.18 -3.33(-1.79) (-1.41) (.70) (-.76) (-.03) (-.64)
INCOME-O 21.90 19.35 .06 10.59 6.29 3.91(2.11) (1.71) (.01) (1.16) (.65) (.53)
ADV-PI .13 .12 -.20(1.04) Cl.01) (-1.44)
ADV-US -.20 -.24 .05(-1.02) (-1. 07) (.49)
QTR2 .40 .34 .14 .23 .10 .09(2.44) (1.73) (1.21) (2.08) (1.19) (1.01)
QTR3 .42 .35 .13 .29 .06 .00(1.96) (1.30) (.73) (1.63) (.37) (-.03)
QTR4 .63 .54 .11 .37 .15 .02(2.11) (1.57) (.46) Cl.54) (.60) (.09)
TIME -.22 -.19 -.01 -.10 -.07 -.03(-1.96) (-1.59) (-.12) (-1.03) (-.70) (-.37)
DUMWO -.12 -.15 -.19 -.12 -.21 -.08(-1.14) (-1.20) (-1.96) (-1.30) (-2.81) (-1.12)
DW 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.2 1.5
R-SQUARE .83 .84 .77 .82 .85 .77
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